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Executive Summary 
While the societal, governmental, and economic benefits of a technologically-connected global 
community are potentially substantial, so too are the risks associated with protecting data and 
securing cyberspace against malicious activity. Providing security in cyberspace has generated 
the need for a new technology discipline: cybersecurity. The continuing proliferation and 
sophistication of cyber threats will allow for cyber actors at many levels, from simple hackers to 
antagonistic nation-states, to utilize them against U.S. interests. The U.S. must therefore be 
equipped both technologically and administratively to address these threats. This report examines 
the issues surrounding U.S. capabilities in providing cyber response, focusing on the federal 
level but including considerations for state and local governments as well as the private sector, in 
order to provide recommendations for developing a comprehensive, national cyber framework.   
Any discussion of a national cyber framework begins with identifying the role of the Federal 
Government and the current laws, strategies, plans, and frameworks that dictate how the Federal 
Government responds to a cyberattack against critical infrastructure. The various and often 
overlapping governance and guidance documents increases the complexity of cyber response. 
Alleviating this complexity requires first understanding the fundamental structure of U.S. critical 
infrastructure and the current capabilities of the Federal Government to respond to a cyberattack. 
An evaluation of the governance and guidance documents outlines the roles and responsibilities 
of each various Federal, state, and local governments, as well as private sector entities and 
identifies overlaps and potential deficiencies in guiding response capabilities.  
Understanding the role that the private sector can assume in cybersecurity is important when 
developing a national cyber framework. Since the majority of U.S. critical infrastructure is 
owned or operated by private sector entities, the capabilities and deficiencies in current private 
sector cybersecurity and cyber defense systems will have an impact on concerns for national 
security. The lack of comprehensive laws and policies to regulate cybersecurity cyber defense 
standards in the private sector has created vulnerabilities within cyberspace. These vulnerabilities 
are amplified due to a lack of a streamlined reporting process between the private sector and the 
government, as well as issues surround response jurisdiction and capabilities. Despite these 
issues, the private sector can still take on a vital role to complement or supplement government 
 vii 
 
cyber capabilities, and the establishment of a public-private partnership for cyber response can 
be a powerful tool to include in a national cyber framework.  
Considerations for protecting the constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy must also be 
included in any discussion of cybersecurity in the context of national defense and security. This 
includes determining the existence of any restrictions or over-restrictions on government 
capabilities, particularly those of the Department of Defense, when operating within U.S. 
Internet Protocol space for national defense. The right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
has been established through historic case law, with more recent Supreme Court rulings 
extending protections for personal privacy to cyberspace. However, the current legal structure of 
defense operations under the U.S. Code allows for the Department of Defense to operate within 
U.S. Internet Protocol space, with some restrictions. The capability to conduct national defense 
and security operations within cyberspace can be further strengthened by utilizing the private 




The United States (U.S.) Constitution elucidates the responsibility of the Federal Government to 
provide for the national defense and to safeguard the individual’s right to privacy: The former is 
defined explicitly in Article One, Section Eight and Article Four, Section Four,1,2 while the latter 
has been established under precedents formed through case law interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment (see Chapter 3 of this report). While these may be considered to be mutually 
exclusive under the conventional understanding of national defense, e.g. the Army does not need 
to enter an individual’s home or ask for personal information to adequately defend the nation, 
changes in how warfare is defined and conducted, coupled with advances in technology, have 
blurred the lines and called into question the ability to defend and guarantee, in whole, a right to 
privacy. 
At the turn of the 21st century, the U.S. military had established near-supremacy in conducting 
20th century conflict by employing the latest in military technology. Utilizing the latest 
advancements in satellite technology, using precision (aka “smart”) bombs, and fully grasping 
the military capabilities of information technology (IT), the U.S. was able to conduct 
conventional warfare on the terms of the more advanced Western military strengths.3 Key to this 
was the expansion of capabilities for electronic warfare, which has existed since the military 
began utilizing advancements in radio technology in the early 20th century, for exploitation and 
control of the battlefield.4 During the first decades of the 21st century, however, conflict began 
shifting to the irregular and the U.S. found itself increasingly engaged in asymmetric warfare, 
especially against terrorist and non-state actors in Afghanistan and Iraq.5,6,7 Asymmetric warfare 
comprises a “disproportionate distribution of power” between adversaries, with the less 
militarily-equipped (i.e. weaker) force utilizing tactics that undermine the military advantage of 
the stronger force.8 The use of cyberspace to conduct asymmetric warfare is likely to increase as 
the resources needed to carry out a cyberattack are relatively low, and these tactics are readily 
available.9 The U.S. has made strides to improve capabilities to engage in such conflict through 
strategies like network-enabled electronic warfare (NEW), which utilizes the growing networks 
of interconnected and adaptive systems that have developed in tandem with the growth and 
proliferation of cyberspace.10 However, the U.S. military will need to find new methods to 
conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield to contend with both the complexities of 
cyberspace and the nature by which asymmetric actors operate.11,12 
 3 
 
This changing conduct of warfare, coupled with globalization and advancements in 
communication technologies, has led to a struggle to balance national defense and individual 
freedom, particularly privacy. The U.S. has spent approximately $80 billion dollars on increasing 
and enhancing counterterrorism measures, both domestic and abroad.13 The struggle to find this 
balance is compounded by how tightly the global community is connected electronically. Even in 
the physical realm, questions have arisen as to how much of the rights to free speech, due 
process, and privacy can be sacrificed in the name of national defense against terrorism.14 
However, these questions rise beyond defending only against terrorism. The extensive growth of 
the Internet and cyberspace, and the more recent hyper-connectivity brought on by the Internet of 
Things (IoT), which by their nature are open and connected and promote freedom of expression, 
have created a vast new space in which malicious actors can operate in near complete anonymity. 
It is these potential threats that exist in this vast, open cyberspace which the nation must defend 
against. 
Cyberspace and the Internet  
In order to understand the challenges faced to defend against malicious activity within 
cyberspace, it is important to briefly describe the principles of cyberspace and the Internet and 
the distinction between them.  
The Internet is the culmination of the continuous development of wireless technologies, 
beginning with the early mathematical models of James Clerk Maxwell in the middle of the 19th 
century through the U.S. patent of Marconi’s wireless telegraph at the turn of the century. In 
attempting to improve upon the existing technology and beat the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) after the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) was tasked with advancing U.S. capabilities in all areas of technological advancement.15 
The simultaneous research being conducted by the RAND Corporation and in universities into 
wireless communication, and that of the U.S. defense industry into satellite technologies and 
computer-to-computer communication, culminated in the development of ARPANET. The 
original purpose of ARPANET was to link research institutions funded by the Pentagon over 
telephone lines.16 ARPANET ultimately served as the catalyst for the development of what 
eventually became the Internet, and industry and academic researchers during the 1980s further 
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advanced the principles of ARPANET to create a technological interface to provide human-to-
human interaction. This led to the creation of the computing discipline by which the Internet was 
allowed to flourish.17,18,19 Kleinrock describes the Internet as “the current manifestation of 
(community of users, merging of analog and digital technologies, and voice, data, video, text, 
image, fax, graphics, and streaming media) and the vortex around which an accelerating wave of 
change and improvement is taking place, not only in infrastructure, but also in the applications, 
users, services, and innovations of the technology.”15 
Cyberspace, as defined by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the “domain within the 
interdependent network of IT infrastructures and resident data. It includes the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”20 
Under this definition, the Internet is understood as one distinct facet of cyberspace, while 
cyberspace comprises all aspects of IT and includes the data collected, stored, and transmitted by 
users. However, when compared with Kleinrock’s definition of the Internet given previously, it 
could be viewed that cyberspace and the Internet are synonymous. Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, 
currently the head of the Social Sciences Department and formerly the director of the 
International Relations Program at West Point, uses “cyberspace” and “Internet” as distinct terms 
and defines cyberspace as “the globally connected networks of hardware, software, and data, as 
well as the people who interact with them,”21 indicating that cyberspace exists at a higher order 
than the Internet. Further examination into the literature regarding cybersecurity (to which this 
report belongs) discusses cyberspace as distinct from the Internet, and for the purposes of this 
report the discussion will center on cyberspace, which will be assumed to include the Internet. 
Specific references may be made to the Internet for purposes of discussion where considering the 
entirety of cyberspace is not appropriate. 
The Internet of Things and Big Data 
The growth of cyberspace after the turn of the 21st century has given rise to new ways in which 
humans can utilize technology to shape the environment around them. Already the world is 
experiencing the next phase in the evolution of computing as the world has moved and continues 
to move further away from the traditional desktop and into a reality where the digital network 
connects the objects around us.22 Cloud computing can provide the ability to perform distributed 
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or parallel computing, in order to improve computing efficiency through scaling complex 
processes. This form of computing can allow for the dynamic sharing, selection, and aggregation 
of resources distributed across various geographic locations.23,24 This transition from using the 
Internet to connect end-user devices to using it to connect physical objects that identify, 
communicate, and interact with each other humans gives rise to the Internet of Things (IoT).25 
Machine-to-machine interaction in the IoT will occur over both wired and wireless technology, 
which can allow for a vast network of objects of all sizes and uses to communicate.26 It is 
predicted that by 2020, up to 28 billion devices will be connected to the Internet, two-thirds of 
which will be represented by previously unconnected devices including household appliances, 
thermostats, automobiles, and sensors.27 The continued proliferation of the IoT will support the 
further development and enhancement of “smart cities,” or cities where infrastructure, city 
management systems, and other basic functions are conducted by objects connected to the 
network.28 
These new, expansive networks and smart cities will require the collection, processing, and 
storage of large amounts of data generated by the connected machines and the human users that 
interface with the machines. Whereas in the past data analysis was more structured and 
conducted in a more static environment, technological advances and a move toward the 
widespread implementation of IoT applications has made big data collection and analysis a 
dynamic and evolutionary process.29 The amount of big data collected can be so large that 
ordinary software technology cannot process all of it,30 requiring alternative means for storage 
and handling of this data until it is needed for processing. Cloud computing provides a useful 
tool, as it has almost unlimited processing and storage capabilities.31 Coupling big data with 
artificial intelligence (AI) is allowing computers to process this vast amount information faster, 
while increasing the ability for machines to make real-time decisions and develop solutions to 
complex problems faster than humans.32 Further advances in quantum computing, which will 
outperform current and future supercomputing capabilities, will also speed up computational 
processes using big data.33,34 
While the potential benefits of this technological interconnectivity and use of big data are 
enormous, the potential threats must also be considered. Any entity that collects, processes, or 
stores digital data puts that data at risk of unauthorized access, corruption, or theft. Wireless 
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connections can also be exploited, allowing for access to control of critical infrastructure, 
networks, and systems by virtually anyone with a computer and an Internet connection. 
Malicious actors that threaten the security of data and connected systems are numerous, and the 
tools they use can be simple and crude, or complex and sophisticated. 
Cybersecurity and Cyber Threats 
The ability to protect IT systems has become critical, as these elements have become ubiquitous 
in modern society and government.35 This is not a new phenomenon, however; the practice of 
protecting digital networks extends back to the 1980s and early 1990s.36 But as the Internet 
becomes more sophisticated and cyberspace continues to expand to include new elements, so too 
will the associated threats continue to grow and become more advanced. The technological 
advancements associated with cyber threats have reduced the amount of resources required to 
perpetrate some types of attacks. This increases the availability of such tools to a number of 
different malicious cyber actors. And those actors with significantly more technological and 
financial resources can utilize more sophisticated types of threats.  
There are various actors that conduct malicious cyber activities. These include hacktivists, 
insider threats, nation-states, cyber terrorists, and cyber criminals. Each of these actors have 
different motivations for carrying out a cyberattack. And each have different levels of 
sophistication and resources with which to launch a specific type of attack. Hacktivists are in 
essence activists that operate, either independently or under a wider organizational structure, 
within cyberspace to achieve or further their specific agenda.37 This agenda is often political, 
religious, or social in nature.38 The main goal of cyber criminals, similar to criminals in the 
physical world, is to steal things from others; in cyberspace, this is typically sensitive 
information that can be used for financial gain.39 Cyber terrorists are also similar to their 
counterparts in the physical world in that they seek a political or ideological end through their 
actions, though cyber terrorists operate in the anonymous and borderless realm of cyberspace.40 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines cyber terror as “the intimidation of civilian 
enterprise through the use of high technology to bring about political, religious, or ideological 
aims, actions that result in disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information.”41 
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Perhaps most alarming is the way in which nation-states are using cyberspace and the Internet to 
conduct malicious and subversive activities against other nations to steal classified information, 
disrupt the operation of critical infrastructure, or subvert the social, economic or governmental 
processes.42 Russia has utilized cyber incursions to intimidate, as in Ukraine in 2015, create fear, 
as in Georgia in 2008, and attempt to destabilize, as in Estonia in 2007.43,44,45 Files stolen from 
the German Parliamentary Committee in 2015 were attributed to Russia or an actor with support 
from Russia, as were the misinformation campaigns in Syria and the Crimea.46 While Russian 
cyber activity against the U.S. has historically been smaller scale, beginning in 2014 Russian 
hacks into U.S. government computers became more complex, even going so far as to attack 
cyberattack alert systems.47 
China too has engaged in malicious cyber activity, both economic and military. Chinese 
economic expansion over the last decades of the 20th and into the 21st century has been attributed 
to intellectual property theft, using the Internet to steal technologies from foreign firms as an 
alternative to domestic innovation.43 The country’s most recent Military Strategic Guidelines 
place on emphasis on “informatization” of the military and an increase in the capabilities for 
asymmetric warfare.48 Chinese cyber incursions against the U.S. began around 2005 to collect 
intelligence, spot vulnerabilities, and insert trapdoors into U.S. military systems.49 The Edward 
Snowden leaks revealed that in 2010, Chinese hackers conducted over 30,000 cyber incursions 
against the networks of the Pentagon and other intelligence agencies to steal information.50 
Smaller, less developed states are also engaging in malicious cyber activity. North Korea 
employs large numbers of government hackers, both internationally and domestically, as a 
military strategy and to provide a government revenue stream.51 Although its cyber infrastructure 
is considered rudimentary, North Korea has utilized sophisticated cyber tactics, including 
advanced persistent threats, against both South Korea and the U.S.52 Iran has been building its 
cyber capabilities as a way to establish dominance in the Persian Gulf and compete against more 
powerful opponents internationally.53 In the wake of Stuxnet, Iran has engaged in a build-up of 
cyber capabilities in direct competition with Israel.54 
Malicious cyber threats can be used in an attack against a network or system in order to 
accomplish a number of goals. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
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provides the following as definitions for an attack within cyberspace.55 The specific NIST 
documents in which these definitions are found are included in parentheses. 
 An attempt to gain unauthorized access to system services, resources, or information, or 
an attempt to compromise system integrity, availability, or confidentiality (NIST SP 800-
82 Rev. 2); 
 Any kind of malicious activity that attempts to collect, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 
information system resources or the information itself (CSSNI 4009-2015, NIST SP 800-
12 Rev. 1, NIST 800-30 Rev. 1); 
 The realization of some specific threat that impacts the confidentiality, integrity, 
accountability, or availability of a computational resource (NIST SP 800-28 Ver. 2); 
 An unauthorized entity’s attempt to fool a Verifier or RP into believing that the 
unauthorized individual in question is the subscriber (NIST SP 800-63-3). 
The Department of Defense (DoD), under Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 “Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military Terms and Associated Terms”, previously used the term “computer 
network attack” (CNA) to describes activities to “alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy 
computer systems or networks,” and the term “computer network exploitation” (CNE) to 
describe “activities taken to penetrate computer systems or networks by an adversary in order to 
obtain information resident on or transiting through these systems or networks. However, JP-3-
13 “Information Operations” approved their removal from JP-1-02 in November 2012. They are 
still used throughout the literature.56,57,58 For the purposes of this report, the terms “attack” and 
“cyberattack” are used to indicate an incident that occurs within cyberspace using any form of 
the methods described below, in accordance with the NIST definitions provided above. The term 
“hack” is used to identify an attack that results only in an unauthorized breach, in accordance 
with the fourth definition provided by NIST above. This type of attack is not intended to collect, 
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy.  
In 2005, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released Report 05-434: Critical 
Infrastructure Protection that included what were at the time identified as the current threats used 
to carry out a cyberattack. The methods and tactics used to carry out a cyberattack include the 
basic and familiar, such as worms, viruses, or malware, to the more sophisticated, including 
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exploit tools and sniffers, to those that require more time and effort to create and implement, 
namely phishing or advanced persistent threat (APT).59 The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint 
Center (IC3) collects information related to Internet crime complaints and analyzes and 
disseminates that information to other law enforcement agencies as well as the general public.60 
The 2016 Internet Crime Report identified compromise of business email, ransomware, tech 
support fraud, elder fraud, and extortion as the major then-current crime trends.61 Emerging 
threats in 2019 include formjacking, where cybercriminals use malicious code in retailers’ 
websites to steal customer credit card information, and the continued use of social media for 
election interference.62 
Worms and viruses are utilized by other attack methods to access the target system or network. 
While they achieve similar functions, worms can autonomously replicate while viruses require 
user action (opening an email, clicking a link) to propagate.63 Phishing and spear phishing are 
social engineering methods used to extract sensitive personal information, usually in the form of 
an email request or an online form. While phishing is a broad threat that is sent to a large number 
of targets, spear phishing is used to target a smaller range of victims and has a higher rate of 
success.64 Other threats identified in the GAO report include:59 
 Exploit tools: publicly-available tools used by actors of varying levels of technical 
proficiency to locate vulnerabilities for entry in target systems or networks;  
 Logic bombs: inserted code that causes a program to perform a destructive action when a 
specifically triggered;  
 Sniffers: programs that are used to intercept and examine routed data to search for 
information transmitted in clear text, such as passwords;  
 Trojan horses: useful or apparently useful software programs that conceal harmful code 
that when triggered executes a harmful function;  
One of the more disruptive cyber threats is distributed denial of service (DDoS). The main intent 
of a DDoS attack is to utilize a large number of computers (referred to as botnets65) to overload a 
network with requests for information, in order to disrupt overall system performance.66 One of 
the most vulnerable targets of a DDoS attack is the Domain Name System (DNS), the complex, 
global distributed database that is a vital for Internet functionality.67 Because the DNS handles 
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such massive amounts of Internet “traffic,” identifying and separating legitimate users from 
potential DDoS incursions is critical but time consuming.68 Perpetrators of a DDoS incursion do 
not need to recruit large numbers of individual users to initiate the attack; instead, they utilize a 
worm or virus, often unknown to the infected machine and user, to infect other computers which 
are then used to carry out the incursion by requesting information from the targeted site.66 
Another type of cyber threat that has the potential for increased malicious activity is the zero-day 
exploit. This type of threat targets a security flaw that exists within installed software, that the 
vendor may or may not know exists, but for which there is no current security patch available to 
address the vulnerability.69 An exploit of a zero-day vulnerability thus takes advantage of the fact 
that the vulnerability may not have been previously identified. After that point, the system is 
already comprised and an attempt to eliminate the vulnerability would not address the infection 
already in the system.70 As software vendors and users have become more aware of the potential 
existence of zero-day vulnerabilities within their systems, malicious actors have recently begun 
using computer worms that can autonomously change their sequence after a successful infection, 
which makes them more difficult to locate using standardized defensive software or fixes.71 
Perhaps the most sophisticated current cyber threat is the advanced persistent threat (APT), 
where an unauthorized access is used to gain entry into a network or system, and the user 
remains in that system undetected for an extended period.72 This type of threat is designed 
specifically for the systems against which it is intended to be used.73 The nature of an APT attack 
requires significant resources, both technical and financial, which means these threats are more 
likely associated with nation-states than with other malicious cyber actors.37 The term “advanced 
persistent threat” was first used as early as 2006 as what was then an unclassified means of 
describing cyber intrusions that originated in China, and between 2005 and 2013 there were 37 
reported APT intrusions attributed to China including APT10 Menupass Team in 2009 and 
APT12 Calc Team in 2012.74 While the targets of these intrusions were initially government 
entities or defense contractors, around the year 2010 APT intrusions specifically used against 
commercial targets increased.75 One of the most famous, and dangerous, APT attacks is the 
Stuxnet attack against the Iranian nuclear program. Hoffman equates this type of attack with a 
biological virus; the computer virus or worm penetrates the host system and can remain dormant 
and undetected until it activates and causes the harm for which it was created76.  
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Despite its immense military defensive capabilities, the U.S. is just as vulnerable to malicious 
cyber actors and activities as any other country. There is constant fear that a coordinated and 
concentrated attack against U.S. critical infrastructure is just beyond the horizon. This so-called 
“digital Pearl Harbor” would have catastrophic consequences.77 The suspected Russian 
interference in the 2016 elections brings the threat to a more personal and pernicious level.78 This 
was a campaign of misinformation and personal persuasion, targeting individual voters on both 
sides of the political spectrum to influence the election and drive.79,80 The real and lasting 
damage goes beyond the results of that one election, however, as the specter of foreign 
interference influencing or changing the outcome of an election significantly undermines the 
foundation of our democratic processes and institutions.36 The new cold war of cybercrime and 
cyber espionage activities both domestically and abroad, as well as the continued advance of 
cyber capabilities by China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, will continue to heighten fears of a 
cyber crisis in the U.S., whether under an actual attack or a fear that one has or may occur.81,82   
Federal Disaster Response 
Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (the 
Stafford Act), which amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), and by extension the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
has oversight of implementation for federal disaster relief assistance and the allocation of federal 
resources for relief.83,84 However, real-time responsibility for incident response originates at the 
local level, with state and Federal assistance provided after local resources are determined to be 
insufficient or have been overwhelmed.85 This “federalist” approach to emergency response can 
complicate authority when multiple jurisdictions are involved, or when attempting to determine 
when the disaster has grown beyond the classification of a localized incident.85  
The overall language of the Stafford Act narrows the scope of Federal emergency response to 
natural disasters or incidents where property damage or significant loss of life has occurred. In 
addition to its use in natural disaster response, the Stafford Act was used in response to the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the 9/11 Attacks, and the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013.84 
The nature of cyberattacks, in that they have historically, in the U.S., caused non-physical 
damage and have not resulted in a loss of life, may not rise to the level of requiring a 
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comprehensive Federal response in the immediate aftermath, and would thus not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Stafford Act. However, a concentrated cyberattack does have the potential to 
cause significant damage, even physical damage, to the nation’s critical infrastructure (see the 
discussion in Chapter 1 of this report). If this type of incident, or worse, was to occur, immediate 
Federal response would be necessary, which will require the existence of a national policy 
framework by which this response can be conducted. 
Basis of Research 
Understanding that securing cyberspace is a complex issue, that cyber threats are an ever-present 
and continuously advancing reality, and that the current Federal emergency response law is not 
directly applicable to a cyberattack response, the authors of this report conducted research on the 
current state of cybersecurity and cyberattack response in the U.S., focusing on the Federal level 
but with consideration for lower levels of government as well as the private sector, to determine 
what frameworks, strategies, or guidance currently exist, and to assess their perceived adequacy 
in addressing cyberattacks. The research focuses on addressing the following statement: 
“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has responsibility for securing the 
nation’s public and private cyberspace. However, it is the Department of Defense 
(DoD) that possesses the preponderance of cyber tools to combat attacks. The 
DoD operates under many restrictions when operating within the geographic 
borders of the U.S. The rules under which DoD operates in cyberspace were 
established based on historical signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection and 
Computer Network Exploitation, Computer Network Defense, and Cyber 
Network Attacks. These rules are meant to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens and 
entities and to place controls on exploitation and offensive operations. The 
separate states’ National Guards under U.S. Code Title 32 have been assigned a 
cyber protection role for their state. This is similar to the long-standing operation 
of National Guard units in response to natural disasters found under the Stafford 
Act. Due to this, much has to be coordinated among the various federal and 
state/local government agencies and private sector elements. The current rules in 
 13 
 
place to defend our nation and private entities against a cyberattack or in response 
to a cyberattack are very restrictive.”  
Addressing this statement requires answering the following two questions: 
1. Does current law over-restrict DoD in conducting national defense operations within 
Internet Protocol (IP) space? 
2. What is the appropriate framework for government entities to coordinate with each other 
and with the private sector to respond to a cyberattack, while respecting the privacy of 
U.S. citizens? 
It is important to distinguish the terminology used in the problem statement and the research 
questions. First, as discussed previously, the term “cyberattack” is used colloquially to refer to 
any incident that could be defined under the NIST definitions of an attack within cyberspace. In 
the instance of an incursion that does not collect, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy, the term 
“hack” may be used. Second, with respect to the first research question, this research focuses 
specifically on IP space, as opposed to all of cyberspace, as it considers the use of the 
communication network specifically, but not to include the use of infrastructure or data more 
broadly.  
Limitations and Assumptions 
The most up-to-date and leading-edge data and information regarding the U.S. government’s 
activities concerning cybersecurity and cyberspace are assumed to be classified. This research 
was therefore limited to unclassified material that was available in the open-source literature, 
discoverable through online databases. This material was also limited in the time in which the 
research could be conducted: Some of the reference material may be from 2018 or 2019, but 
analyses on laws and regulations passed after November 2018 were not included, though these 
may be referenced in passing. There is a lack in consistency with what documentation is 
available, what is included in that documentation, and even the terminology used within that 
documentation, particularly between the various Federal agencies and entities. Every effort has 
been made to coordinate and correlate across the research material to create a level of 
consistency for this report. Additionally, cyber-specific policies will continue to change as new 
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types of threats and actors appear within the cyber realm, and as cyber technology continues to 
advance. These policies will also change in conjunction with changes at the Federal level. New 
presidential administrations will have differing policy objectives regarding cybersecurity, and 
changes in the composition of Congress will impact how successful a president can be at 
achieving specific policy objectives. Finally, the research is limited in that the findings and 
recommendations are tailored to include defensive cyber capabilities only.  
The research was conducted under the following assumptions, as found in the open-source 
literature: 
 All parties, including Federal agencies and entities, operate within their jurisdiction as 
prescribed by law;86,87,88 
 DHS has the overriding authority regarding the protection of critical infrastructure;89,90,91 
 The majority of critical infrastructure is owned and/or operated by the private sector. 
The exact amount ranges between 80% and 90% in the literature and what FEMA has 
reported;92,93 
 There currently is no clear, singular, comprehensive federal framework for responding to 
cyber incidents. As such, we assume that this type of framework is necessary.58,59,60,61 
Additionally, the research was conducted under the following assumptions that cannot be 
verified in the literature due to the classified nature of government operations. However, for the 
purpose of answering the research questions for this paper, these two assumptions are essential: 
 DoD is currently restricted from effectively combating cyber threats through information 
and data gathering; 
 DoD possess the preponderance of capabilities to combat cyber threats. 
Structure of Report 
This report is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 focuses on the response mechanisms and 
frameworks that are currently in place to respond in the event of a cyber incident. This chapter 
examines the current structure of critical infrastructure and discusses cyber incidents that have 
occurred within critical infrastructure around the world. The chapter evaluates each of the 
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primary plans, strategies, frameworks, and partnerships, developed by a variety of departments, 
agencies, and documents. This evaluation outlines the roles and responsibilities of each entity in 
the event of a cyber incident. The overlap of these documents and agencies are presented and 
analyzed through a scorecard that identifies which authority has responsibility over specific 
response activities. The chapter concludes with recommendations on how the Federal 
Government should move forward to better streamline cyber incident response mechanisms.  
Chapter 2 focuses on cybersecurity within the private sector, identifying the laws that govern 
how private sector entities operate within cyberspace. This chapter discusses the current state of 
cybersecurity regulation for the private sector and identifies the deficiencies in incident reporting 
to the Federal Government, as well as issues surrounding government jurisdiction over private 
industry and cyberspace. This chapter examines the relationship and interaction between the 
private sector and the government, and proposes a path forward for a more cooperative 
relationship regarding cybersecurity through public-private partnerships and cyber insurance. 
The chapter also discusses how the private sector can be utilized to address deficiencies in 
Federal Government cyber capabilities, including providing innovation and overcoming 
governmental restrictions for operating in cyberspace. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the personal information of private American citizens, the rights that 
protect that information, and the implications of cybersecurity on these rights. This chapter 
defines what comprises personal identifiable information and identifies the laws and regulations 
in place to protect this information, and then provides recommendations for how DoD can 
engage in cybersecurity without infringing on those rights through partnering with private 
industry or DHS. This chapter also provides clarity on how DoD is restricted when operating in 
U.S. IP space, specifically regarding the protection and usage of private information.  
The final section provides the overarching recommendations for elements to be included in a 
comprehensive federal cyber framework, how the government and private industry can create a 
partnership to implement that framework, how the private industry can be included in that 
framework, and how that framework can allow DoD to operate within IP space to provide for 
national security while maintaining individual rights. 
16 
Annex A attached to this report applies the concepts and recommendations presented herein to a 
hypothetical cyberattack scenario, which the authors created. This scenario includes specifics of 
the attack, the effects of the attack on the community in which the attack occurs, and the 
response of state, local, and Federal Government authorities. The Annex will document the 
timeline of both the attack and the response, and will provide an overview of how and when the 
various guidance and governance documents are executed. 
Figure I-1 presents a visual representation of the critical aspects of a comprehensive U.S. cyber 
framework. Included in the graphic are the relevant governance and guidance documents that 
address U.S. cybersecurity and cyber incident response. These include Federal laws, 
Constitutional amendments, Executive Branch directives, and agency-specific and interagency 
documents. Also included in the graphic are the stakeholders impacted by a U.S. cyber 
framework, spanning both the public and private sectors. All of these documents and 
stakeholders play a critical role in cybersecurity and cyberattack response, and therefore must be 
considered in any comprehensive Federal framework. This graphic was used as a strategic 
outline to guide and define the scope of the report to answer the research questions. 
Figure I-1
Critical Aspects of a 
Comprehensive U.S. 
Cyber Framework
   Dr. Danny W. Davis, 2019
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Understanding the measures necessary to protect the United States (U.S.) and its critical 
infrastructure from cyberattacks first requires determining how the nation’s critical infrastructure 
is defined. The definition of critical infrastructure has been formed over time by presidential 
decree. President Clinton’s Executive Order (EO) 13010 established the President’s Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection and included language that specified how infrastructure is 
identified as “critical:” “Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United 
States.”1 The “certain national infrastructures” considered as vital included electrical power 
systems, communication services, finance, transportation, emergency services, water supply 
systems, and continuity of government.2 It is important to note here that while the sectors of 
critical infrastructure now fall under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), at the time 
this EO was established DHS did not exist. The current placement of critical infrastructure under 
DHS authority, established through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, shows an important 
evolution in the structure of homeland security within the U.S. 
In 2013 President Obama issued an EO on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, EO 
13636, to address threats posed by cyberattacks that could disrupt the nation’s power, water, 
communication, or other critical systems. EO 13636 further defines critical infrastructure as the 
“systems and assets, whether physical of virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity 
or destruction of [such] would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”3,4  
Section 4 of EO 13636 requires the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
the Director of Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to produce unclassified 
reports of current cyber threats. Under this section, the Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, and 
ODNI are given their first role in merging cyber threats with the vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructure. Section 4, subsection c, requires coordination between DHS and the Department 
of Defense (DoD) by mandating that together they “establish procedures to expand the Enhanced 
Cybersecurity program to all critical infrastructure sectors.”4 The Enhanced Cybersecurity 
program was one of the first to establish a working partnership between the public and private 
sectors regarding classified cyber matters. This was important to create due to the close 
contracting between public and private and the need-to-know of vulnerabilities. Additionally, 
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this EO provided direction for cybersecurity considerations that culminated in the creation of the 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) framework that establishes best 
practices for cybersecurity that public and private entities are encouraged to follow. 
“Critical infrastructures” as defined under both EO 13010 and 13636 encompass a wide range of 
organizations and structures that are vital for the uninterrupted operation of American society. 
Additionally, each individual element of these organizations and structures must be maintained, 
protected, and managed in order to function properly. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), 
entitled Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience and implemented in 2013 in conjunction 
with EO 13636, established sixteen distinct sectors of critical infrastructure.5 PPD-21 assigned a 
Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) to each sector of critical infrastructure, and each SSA is 
individually responsible for a portion of the financial, industrial, security, public health, 
communication, technological, and other critical functions of our nation. These SSAs include the 
DHS, the DoD, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of the Treasury (USDT), the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). While the head of each SSA is responsible for 
developing and maintaining cyber defense strategies and plans specific to their sector, DHS 
coordinates efforts between all sectors and directs the Federal Government’s overall protection 
and security of all critical infrastructure.6 Figure 1-1 shows each the critical infrastructure 
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Figure 1-1 Critical Infrastructure Sectors7 
 
Various laws and legislation have been developed to assist in the protection of critical 
infrastructure from the cyber threats of the modern world. In May 2017, Presidential Executive 
Order on “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure” 
(PEO 13800) was created to implement “The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity” produced by NIST, while also modernizing the cyber defense plans formed under 
the mandate included in PPD-21.8 PPD-41, issued in 2016, focused on the cybersecurity 
elements contained within the nation’s National Preparedness Goals by creating principles that 
guide the Federal Government’s response to any cyberattack involving government or private 
sector critical infrastructure entities. These principles dictate that in response to any cyberattack, 
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Federal agencies shall undertake three simultaneous lines of effort: Threat response, asset 
response, and intelligence support and related activities. Achieving all three of these lines of 
effort is meant to facilitate more adequate protection against cyberattacks.8  
On November 16, 2018, President Trump signed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency Act of 2018 into law. This act elevates the mission of the former National Protection and 
Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS through the establishment of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). CISA was created to “defend critical infrastructure 
against the threats of today, while working with partners across all levels of government and in 
the private sector to secure against the evolving risks of tomorrow.”9 CISA has been officially 
tasked with protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure from both physical attacks and 
cyberattacks, which will require the effective coordination and collaboration of various 
government and private sector organizations.9  
Cyberattacks and Critical Infrastructure 
Although the majority of the nation’s critical infrastructure and resources are owned by the 
private sector, the government has a vested interest in addressing any potential vulnerabilities 
that such infrastructure and resources have to an attack, particularly when government entities 
are involved.10 Addressing potential vulnerabilities becomes increasingly difficult and complex 
when considering that these infrastructures and resources are susceptible to not only physical 
attacks, but also to constantly evolving cyber threats. The following are examples of how real 
cyberattacks have exposed inadequate protective measures for some of the largest infrastructure 
sectors in the U.S.   
Stuxnet 
One of the most prolific and malicious cyberattack methods is the Stuxnet computer worm, first 
publicly deployed in 2010. Stuxnet was developed to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program by 
targeting Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and other machines within nuclear facilities 
that were using Microsoft Windows software.11,12 The attack physically damaged the nuclear 
reactors, demonstrating that a cyberattack could be used as a war tactic that can cause physical 
damage and exposed new vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure.13,14 The implications of 
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Stuxnet go beyond the potential for use as a weapon of war. When it was used against the Iranian 
nuclear reactors, the worm targeted the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems of the reactors, as well as other systems that were used to directly control reactor 
operations. SCADA systems have been used for years across multiple sectors of critical 
infrastructure, including oil and gas refineries as well as electrical grids.15,16 The proliferation of 
SCADA systems throughout critical infrastructure networks and their susceptibility to the 
Stuxnet attack expose a substantial vulnerability that must be addressed. Although it is not 
certain who developed Stuxnet, many believed that the U.S. and Israel worked together to 
develop the worm.17,18 
Rye, NY Attack 
A smaller but no less concerning cyberattack occurred in the New York City suburb of Rye. A 
hacker gained access to the control system of the Bowman Avenue Dam in 2013, though the 
hack was not discovered until two years later in 2015. Responsibility for the hack was eventually 
claimed by SOBH Cyber Jihad, an Iranian hacktivist group; the group claimed they maintained 
their silence about the hack for two years in accordance with a “state-level” warning not to go 
public about the hack.19 However, the attack and the group’s responsibility were never 
acknowledged by the Iranian government.20 
Although the Bowman Avenue Dam itself is a relatively smaller dam and the attack did not 
affect many people at that time, the reality that the hack was able to occur revealed wider 
implications for vulnerabilities in a massive sector of critical infrastructure, including the fact 
that the hack was not discovered until two years after it occurred. Senator Charles Schumer of 
New York said that the revelation of the attack “should be a wakeup call that the nation’s critical 
infrastructure is too vulnerable to ‘evil-doers’ toiling away at keyboards.”20 Under normal 
conditions, the hackers should have been able to use the remote access to release water from 
behind the dam; however, the dam was undergoing maintenance at that time and the sluice gate 
was manually disconnected, preventing electronic control.21 This event is specifically considered 
a hack as it was only intended as an undetected intrusion, but was not intended to physically 
damage the structure.22 
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Ukrainian Power Grid Attack 
On December 23, 2015 an electric company in western Ukraine reported power outages due to 
illegal activity detected within the company’s SCADA systems perpetrated by a then-unknown 
actor.23 In a report released by DHS, attribution for the attack was not officially determined; 
however, per information obtained from DHS’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team and the U.S. cyber intelligence firm iSight, the attack was linked back to 
“Sandworm,” a known Russian hacking group.24,25,23  
In total, three Ukrainian electrical distribution groups experienced coordinated cyberattacks that 
occurred within thirty minutes of each other. Initially, it was estimated that 80,000 customers 
were affected, but detailed reports of the incident later indicated that the total number of affected 
customers was closer to 225,000.25,23 The power outages lasted for several hours, but were 
eventually restored.  
This attack is significant in that it was the first publically-acknowledged cyberattack that resulted 
in power outages due to a targeted attack on SCADA systems within a nation’s critical 
infrastructure.25,26. Additionally, it brought to light the importance of understanding the ability of 
foreign adversaries to attack power grids and potentially damage a nation’s critical infrastructure. 
The threat of a power outage on the scale of the Ukraine attack goes beyond its effect on large-
scale critical infrastructure. Such an attack would also have significant effects on everyday life, 
as the loss of electronic devices, appliances, and systems such as powering refrigerators, ovens, 
cell phone and mobile computer charging, and access to electronic medical records can cause 
harm to individuals and pose a threat to national security.26  
Atlanta Ransomware Attack 
A January 2018 audit of the City of Atlanta’s information technology (IT) infrastructure 
identified between 1,500 and 2,000 vulnerabilities, confirming previous criticisms that the city 
had not been spending enough to adequately upgrade the city’s internal systems.27 Two months 
later, on March 22, a massive SamSam ransomware attack struck the city’s internal systems, 
locking files and demanding a ransom of approximately $50,000 in bitcoin.28,29 The SamSam 
ransomware is unique from other forms of ransomware in that it does not rely on phishing to 
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achieve its goal; instead, it uses a “brute-force attack” to guess individual passwords until a 
match is found.30,31 Since Atlanta is a hub for transportation, health, and economics, the incident 
received attention nationwide and brought to light cyber vulnerabilities within one of the largest 
cities in the nation, with real-time and lasting effects.  
As the SamSam attack spread throughout the city’s IT infrastructure, it affected many of the 
city’s programs and services, including parking, utility, and court services.31,29 Additionally, 
many legal documents and years of police dash-cam videos were permanently deleted. City 
employees were not able to return to their computers for another five days and many systems 
have still not recovered.28 
On November 26, 2018 a U.S. grand jury indicted two Iranian hackers for the attack who the 
DOJ alleged are part of the SamSam group.32 The group, based in Iran but with no known 
affiliation with the Iranian government, is known for choosing targets that are most likely to 
consent to ransom demands as well as finding and locking up the victims’ most valuable 
information.30,32 The attack is currently the largest successful breach of security for a major 
American city by ransomware and affected up to 6 million people. The SamSam attack has 
prompted many cities across the nation to examine the security of their infrastructure systems 
and evaluate the availability of resources to address a cyber incident of similar severity were it to 
happen to them.29,27 
These examples demonstrate the current existence of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure 
networks, and how a directed cyberattack against even one of these vulnerable networks can 
bring the operations of an entire city to a standstill, or physically damage structures. Had any of 
these attacks escalated further, it could have ultimately led to loss of life, potentially even as 
significant as nuclear meltdown or dam failure. Table 1-1 lists additional cyberattacks that have 
occurred across the world. The Stuxnet attack and the attack on the Ukrainian power grid are 
included in this table, while the Rye, NY and Atlanta Ransomware attacks are not. Recognizing 
the continued proliferation of cyberattacks is vital to understanding the implications of future 
attacks and the need for adequate cybersecurity measures to address potential attacks on U.S. 
critical infrastructure. A clear understanding of the frameworks and roles of cyber response and 
preparedness currently in place is vital to successful prevention and mitigation in the event of a 
33
cyberattack. As such, the development of a universal response framework will provide both 
government and private sector entities the ability to adequately respond to such attacks. This 
framework could generate more productive response measures and hopefully decrease the 
amount and severity of damage, especially when critical infrastructure is targeted. 
Adapted From: Davis, J. S., Boudreaux, B., Welburn, J. W., Aguirre, J., Ogletree, C., McGovern, G., & Chase, M. S. 2017. Stateless Attribution: Toward International 
Accountability in Cyberspace. Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html 
34 
 
Table 1-1 Notable Cyberattacks 
Incident Country of incident Year incident began Impact 




United States 1986 
Intrusion and sensitive 
data exfiltration 
Criminal trial in West 
Germany, 1990 
Titan Rain United States 2003 
Exfiltration of sensitive 




Laboratories, and the 
FBI, as well as U.S. and 
British defense 
departments 
Widely attributed to 
China by government 
and private sources in 
news outlets in 2005; 
dissent by Chinese state 
Estonian DDoS Estonia 2007 
Large-scale DDoS 
attack of Estonian 
websites in the context 
of tensions with Russia 
 
Accusations by Estonian 
government to Russian 
state actors; Russia 




Stuxnet Worm Iran 2010 




Widely attributed to the 
United States and Israel; 
leaks by U.S. officials 
DDoS attacks on U.S. 
banks 
United States 2012 
DDoS attacks on more 
than 46 major U.S. 
financial institutions 
Widespread perception 
of Iranian state 
sponsorship; initial U.S. 
government leaks and 
eventual indictment of 




Adapted From: Davis, J. S., Boudreaux, B., Welburn, J. W., Aguirre, J., Ogletree, C., McGovern, G., & Chase, M. S. 2017. Stateless Attribution: Toward International 
Accountability in Cyberspace. Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html 
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Table 1-1 Notable Cyberattacks 
Incident Country of incident Year incident began Impact 
Attribution in the 
Public Domain 
Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia 2012 and 2016 
Wiped or destroyed 
35,000 Saudi Aramco 
computers; similar 
attack in late 2016 
In 2012, U.S. officials 





United States 2013 
Compromised 
Associated Press 
Twitter account and 
tweeted false news of an 
attack on the White 
House, leading to sharp 
stock market declines  
Attack claimed by 
Syrian Electronic Army 
 
White House and State 
Department 
United States 2014 
Significant intrusion in 
unclassified computer 
systems 
Widely attributed to 
Russia but no official 
attribution by U.S. 
government 
Sony Pictures United States 2014 
Sensitive data stolen 
and leaked; significant 
business disruption 
Attributed to North 
Korean state actors by 
U.S. President in 
December 2014 and to 
Lazarus by Operation 
Blockbuster in 2016 
GitHub United States 2015 
Large and persistent 
DDoS attack on 
software development 
collaboration site 
Widely attributed to 
Chinese state actors by 
private firms and 
researchers 
TV5Monde France 2015 
18-hour TV network 
outage; false flag leads 
to false attribution to 
ISIS 
FireEye attributed to 
Russian hacking group 
APT28 in June 2015 
 
Adapted From: Davis, J. S., Boudreaux, B., Welburn, J. W., Aguirre, J., Ogletree, C., McGovern, G., & Chase, M. S. 2017. Stateless Attribution: Toward International 
Accountability in Cyberspace. Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html 
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Table 1-1 Notable Cyberattacks 
Incident Country of incident Year incident began Impact 
Attribution in the 
Public Domain 
OPM United States 2015 
Exfiltration of 21.5 
million personnel 
records of U.S. 
government employees 
Widely attributed to 
China although never 
officially attributed by 
U.S. government 
German Parliament Germany 2015 
Exfiltration and release 
of 2,420 sensitive files 
belonging to German 
Christian Democratic 
Union 
BfV attribution to 
APT28 in news outlets 
in May 2016 
Ukraine power grid Ukraine 2016 
Loss of power for 






accused Russia; private 
firms suggest possible 




United States 2016 
Exfiltration and release 
of DNC and campaign 
documents; interference 
with 2016 U.S. 
presidential election 
CrowdStrike (June 
2016) and DNI report 
(January 2017) 





Successful bank heist of 
$81 million from 
Bangladesh Central 
Bank account at the 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York using 





Symantec report links to 
Lazarus May 2016; U.S. 
intelligence agencies 
report link to North 
Korea state news outlets 
in March 2017 
Adapted From: Davis, J. S., Boudreaux, B., Welburn, J. W., Aguirre, J., Ogletree, C., McGovern, G., & Chase, M. S. 2017. Stateless Attribution: Toward International 
Accountability in Cyberspace. Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html 
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Table 1-1 Notable Cyberattacks 
Incident Country of incident Year incident began Impact 
Attribution in the 
Public Domain 
Mossack Fonseca Panama 2016 
11.5 million leaked 
documents representing 
more than 214,488 
“offshore entities," 
leading to numerous tax 
evasion and corruption 
charges 
No attribution to date; 
possible hacktivists 
and/or insiders 
Dyn United States 2016 
DDoS attack using a 
botnet of Internet of 
Things devices against 
Dyn, a domain name 
system (DNS) provider, 
disabling a significant 
number of websites 
No official attribution; 
widely believed to be a 
hacktivist organization 
such as Anonymous, 
New World Hackers, or 
SpainSquad 
WannaCry Worldwide 2017 
Ransomware attack 





No official attribution; 
some private firms 
suggest links to Lazarus 
Group; Russia blamed 
the United States for 





Government Agencies and Responsibilities for Cybersecurity 
Per Figure I-1 in the Introduction, there are many guiding agencies, policies, and coordination 
agreements that must be considered regarding critical infrastructure and cyberattack response 
mechanisms. While they all play an important role in coordinating a response, each is guided by 
different authorities. Due to critical infrastructure falling under the umbrella of DHS, but 
touching multiple other industries and agencies such as DoD and DOJ as well as the individual 
SSAs, response planning mechanisms are not easy to establish. Throughout this section, a variety 
of the most important response and authorization documents are analyzed. These documents 
include the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP), the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP), the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy, the National Response Framework 
(NRF), CISA, the DoD Cyber Strategy (DoD CS), InfraGard, EO 13010, EO 13636, PPD-21, 
PPD-41, PEO 13800, the DoD-DHS Cyber Coordination Agreement, the National Cyber 
Strategy (NCS), and the National Security Strategy (NSS). These documents will be used to 
identify any overlaps and evaluate any vulnerabilities in the current state of cyberattack response 
mechanisms for critical infrastructure entities. Though the following sections are categorized by 
the major agencies involved (DHS, DoD, and DOJ), there are overlaps within these sections as 
some documents under a certain agency have equal or interconnected responsibilities within a 
different agency.  
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
The official mission of DHS is to “prevent terrorism and enhance security, manage borders 
administer immigration laws, secure cyberspace, and ensure disaster resilience.”33 Specific 
authority is granted to DHS to achieve this mission through PPDs issued by the President and 
conducted through the strategies and plans produced by the separate departments within DHS. 
This section will focus on the portion of the mission that “secures cyberspace,” particularly as it 








Table 1-2 DHS Cyber Response Guidance Documents 
 
 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)  
CISA, as discussed previously, is housed under DHS. It is structured into four divisions: 
Cybersecurity; Infrastructure Security; Emergency Communications; and the National Risk 
Management Center (NRMC). Each of these divisions is tasked with different priorities, some of 
which are meant to mitigate and some to adapt. The main goal of the Cybersecurity Division 
(CD) is to assist in safeguarding the “.gov” network that facilitates the day to day function of the 
government network. The Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) coordinates security and 
resilience efforts through public-private partnerships and delivers technical assistance if called 
upon. The Emergency Communications Division (ECD) is responsible for ensuring the function 
of interoperable communications across all facets of government. Finally, the NRMC works with 
all entities involved in securing critical infrastructure by “identify[ing], analyz[ing], 
prioritiz[ing], and manag[ing]” the most strategic risks to critical functions of the nation.34 
DHS Cybersecurity Strategy  
The DHS Cybersecurity Strategy (DHS CS), released in November of 2018 under the Trump 
Administration, directly discusses critical infrastructure under Pillar 2, Goal 3: Protect Critical 
Infrastructure. As previously discussed, critical infrastructure is vital to the overall function of 
the nation as it controls national security, public health and safety, and economic security, and an 
attack against any sector could therefore endanger public safety and potentially lead to loss of 
life. Pillar 2, Goal 3 outlines three primary objectives for cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, 
with each objective requiring the engagement of a variety of both government and 
nongovernmental actors.35 These objectives are: 
● Objective 3.1: Maturing cyber security offerings and engagements to address 
national risks to critical infrastructure 
 NCIRP NIPP DHS 
CS 
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● Objective 3.2:  Expand and improve sharing of cyber threat indicators, defensive 
measures, and other cybersecurity information 
● Objective 3.3: Improve cybersecurity capabilities and resources available to 
sector-specific agencies, regulators, and policymakers 
Despite the inclusion of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), which is controlled by DoD, the 
DHS CS does not mention any roles for agencies that are not DHS. The only instance in which 
another agency is specifically mentioned by name is through a footnote on page 8, which 
provides a caveat that DHS leads the effort in Federal cyber hygiene with the exception of 
national security systems and some DoD and intelligence community systems. It does not, 
however, explicitly specify what comprises national security or DoD and intelligence community 
(IC) systems.   
National Response Framework (NRF) 
The process by which disaster response is conducted in the U.S., as stipulated in the Stafford Act 
(see discussion in the Introduction), is outlined in the National Response Framework (NRF). 
This framework, issued by DHS in 2013 under the Obama Administration, describes the roles, 
responsibilities, and structures “of a threat or hazard, in anticipation of a significant event, or in 
response to an incident.”36 The NRF outlines a tiered structure that facilitates a “bottom-up” 
approach for disaster response,37 emphasizing that the NRF can be partially or fully implemented 
for a scaled incident response. Implementation of the NRF will vary depending on the size, 
severity, and scope of the incident. Cybersecurity is explicitly identified as a response core-
capability of the NRF, based on the results of the Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA), 
as threats and hazards related to “malicious cyber activity can have catastrophic 
consequences.”36 
Under the NRF, the Secretary of Homeland Security is designated as the principal incident 
manager for domestic incidents and is tasked with providing an overall architecture for domestic 
incident management and coordination of Federal emergency response. The Federal emergency 
response requiring coordination with other Federal agencies to create a unified response to 
domestic incidents. The heads of other Federal agencies are tasked with other responsibilities; 
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specifically, the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications coordinates the 
response of significant cyberattacks. Additionally, under the NRF it is the responsibility of DHS 
to re-establish critical communications and coordinate communications support within response 
efforts.36 This task is #2 within the 15 NRF Emergency Support Functions. 
National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) 
Building off the response structures and procedures outlined in the NRF, the National Cyber 
Incident Response Plan (NCIRP), authorized in 2016 by the Obama Administration, defines 
similar, comprehensive mitigation, response, and recovery procedures for cyberattacks.38 The 
NCIRP was developed in accordance with the principles of PPD-41, articulating the “roles and 
responsibilities, capabilities, and coordinating structures” for response and recovery from cyber 
incidents affecting critical infrastructure.38 Like the NRF, the NCIRP stresses that cyberattack 
response is a unified effort of all levels of government as well as the private sector and the 
general public. The NCIRP differs from the NRF in that the NCIRP does not represent an 
operational plan for cyberattack response. Instead, the NCIRP serves as a guiding document for 
the development of organization-specific operational plans, as implemented by government 
agencies or private sector entities.38 
Cooperation between government and the private sector to develop and implement robust 
cybersecurity strategies is vital for the protection of critical infrastructure, due to the majority of 
critical infrastructure being owned by the private sector. The development of such strategies will 
be conducted in accordance with industry standards put forth by NIST, which focus on a risk-
based framework to provide cybersecurity resilience of critical infrastructure.39 This may require 
government intervention if private sector cybersecurity implementation is deemed inadequate.40 
Under the NCIRP, the Federal Government and the private sector work concurrently to provide 
threat and asset response capabilities.38 In another departure from the NRF, the NCIRP does not 
designate DHS as the sole lead Federal agency (LFA) for response coordination between 
government and the private sector when there is a cyberattack primarily involving the private 
sector. Instead, the LFA will depend on the response activities being performed: DOJ serves as 
the LFA for coordinating threat response; DHS serves as the LFA for coordinating asset 
response; and ODNI serves as the lead in coordinating intelligence support.38 
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DHS does coordinates asset response through the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC). The primary role of asset response is to support technical assistance 
to affected entities, mitigate vulnerabilities, and assess the risk of said vulnerabilities. 
Specifically, if a Federal Government system is affected by a cyberattack, a U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), under the authority of DHS, must be notified within 
one hour of the attack being officially confirmed by the Computer Security Incident Response 
Team (CSIRT). Additionally, US-CERT plays a role in assisting local government with 
resources and capabilities to address and respond to the attack.  
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), created in 2013 under the Obama 
Administration, is another DHS guidance document that plays a major role in cybersecurity 
efforts, specifically regarding critical infrastructure. It is the principal document required for 
critical infrastructure preparedness and protection to ensure secure and resilient critical 
infrastructure networks. The NIPP accomplishes this through establishing a framework in which 
the public and private sectors cooperate to disseminate information, communicate, and prepare 
for attacks.  
The NIPP includes the following ten key concepts: 
● Provides an updated approach to critical infrastructure security and resilience;  
● Recommends greater focus on integration of cyber and physical security efforts; 
● Fosters closer alignment to national preparedness efforts; 
● Increases focus on cross sector and jurisdictional coordination to achieve results;  
● Recognizes integration of information-sharing as an essential component of the 
risk management framework; 
● Recognizes the key role and knowledge of critical infrastructure owners and 
operators;  
● Integrates efforts by all levels of government, private, and nonprofit sectors by 
providing an inclusive partnership framework and recognizing unique expertise 
and capabilities each participant brings to the national effort; 
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● Reflects today’s integrated all-hazards environment;  
● Remains grounded in business principles and existing policy;  
● Drives action toward long-term improvement 
Each concept is equally important as together they provide comprehensive guidance and 
direction for all levels of government and the private sector to synchronize their efforts in the 
event of an attack against critical infrastructure.41   
Sector Specific Agencies 
As previously mentioned, SSAs were assigned to each of the sixteen sectors of critical 
infrastructure through PPD-21 to ensure proper oversight and guidance through DHS. The roles 
and responsibilities of the SSAs in critical infrastructure protection are outlined throughout 
various documents and agency strategies, as indicated in Table 1-3. 
Table 1-3 SSA Cyber Response Guidance Documents 
 
NCIRP 
The NCIRP places specific responsibilities on each SSA, such as increased communication with 
privately owned critical infrastructure that fall under their specific control. NCIRP also states 
that the main role of each SSA is to coordinate the efforts of the Federal Government if an attack 
takes place within their specific sector of critical infrastructure.  
NIPP 
The NIPP stresses the need for coordination and communication between each SSA and the 
organizations, both federally- and privately-owned, that are included in their specific sector. The 
methods by which this coordination should occur is not specifically outlined in the NIPP; 
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instead, each SSA and their respective administrations are responsible for developing these 
methods. 
DHS Cybersecurity Strategy  
The DHS CS explains that SSAs have an important role in the coordination and oversight of each 
sector of critical infrastructure. It also puts a great emphasis on the relationship between SSAs 
and other agencies.  
DoD Cyber Strategy 
The DoD CS makes only one mention of SSAs, when describing the roles of the Defense Critical 
Infrastructure (DCI) and the DIB within DoD. The SSAs play a small role in helping protect 
DoD critical infrastructure, as it is primarily protected by DoD itself.  
EO 13010 
EO 13010 created the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and placed 
two members of each SSA on the Commission.  
EO 13636 
EO 13636 fails to provide guidance for the SSAs regarding cyber protection of critical 
infrastructure due to its vague reference to coordination that must take place without prescribing 
how this coordination should be conducted.  
PPD-41  
PPD-41 provides more detailed responsibilities for the SSAs regarding the protection of critical 
infrastructure, specifically that of the private sector. It states that “[t]he relevant [SSA] will 
generally coordinate the Federal Government’s efforts to understand the potential business or 




Department of Defense (DoD)  
DoD plays a vital role in protecting critical infrastructure, particularly the DIB. However, this 
role becomes a little less clear as many of the strategies and frameworks list DoD as solely a 
supporting actor to DHS. The documents below discuss the supporting role that DoD plays, as 
indicated in Table 1-4. 
Table 1-4 DoD Cyber Response Guidance Documents 
 
DoD Cyber Strategy  
In September 2018, DoD released its new Cyber Strategy (DoD CS). Though the full document 
is classified, an unclassified summary has been made available to the public. The strategy is 
comprised of four pillars and five lines of effort to help execute the DoD CS. The four pillars 
are: 
1. Protecting the American people, the homeland and the American way of life by 
safeguarding networks, systems, functions, and data;  
2. Promoting American prosperity by nurturing a secure, thriving digital economy and 
fostering strong domestic innovation;  
3. Preserving peace and security by strengthening the ability of the U.S., its partners and 
allies to deter and punish those who use cyber maliciously;  
4. Advancing American influence to extend the key tenants of an open, interoperable, 
reliable, and secure internet.  
The five lines of effort to help execute these pillars are as: build a more lethal force; compete and 
deter in cyberspace; strengthen alliances and attack new partnerships; reform the department; and 
cultivate talent.  
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For strategic competition in the cyber realm, DoD’s first high-level priority is ensuring their 
ability to fight and win wars in any domain. Fulfilling this mission completely requires 
protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure, as the DIB and non-DoD operated critical 
infrastructure are imperative to the success of DoD fighting and winning wars. It is important to 
note that the DoD CS specifically states that DoD should be prepared to defend “when directed,” 
including to defend networks and systems that are not operated by DoD nor are part of the DIB.  
The DoD CS also establishes the role of DoD within critical infrastructure as an entity that is 
charged with preempting and deterring malicious cyber actors from targeting critical 
infrastructure as a whole. This is an important distinction because it is a role that DHS currently 
is not playing. Deterring and preempting is currently purely under the purview of DoD.42  
The second line of effort to pursue the four pillars requires DoD to compete and deter within 
cyberspace to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure within the U.S. This requires that 
DoD partners with other agencies and entities within the Federal Government to streamline 
information sharing.  
NIPP  
While DoD is mentioned throughout the NIPP, its primary role is defined as the SSA for the 
DIB. Any responsibilities beyond this role will be exercised only at the request of another 
Federal agency. The NIPP is specific about this when it is discussing SSAs: Footnote c on page 
43 expressly states that any provisions included in the plan do not supersede or affect the 
authority of DoD entities or their chain of command.  
NCIRP  
For response to a cyberattack, the DoD performs a similar role as it would for other national 
emergencies: Namely, defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). DoD resources and 
capabilities can be utilized to assist with response efforts of other government agencies or 
entities when requested by DHS, and/or when authorized by the President or the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF).43 Under the NCIRP, DoD has the specific responsibility for threat and asset 
response when DoD assets and the DoD Information Network (DoDIN) are affected, with 
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cooperation from both DOJ and DHS.38 Within the NCIRP, DoD’s primary task is to handle all 
matters dealing with the DIB. Other Federal agencies will become involved if called upon by 
DoD.  
NRF  
Within the NRF, it is stated that DoD resources can be committed to respond when requested by 
another Federal agency, or when directed by the President. 
EO 13010  
Under this EO, the SECDEF, along with the heads of other agencies, should nominate two full-
time members to be on the commission that reports to the President. An Infrastructure Protection 
Task Force (IPTF) was to be established to include DoD as a member. The IPTF was charged 
with providing and coordinating the provision of critical infrastructure as well as issuing 
notifications of potential cyber threats and issuing direct warnings in the event of an attack.  
EO 13636  
Under this EO, the SECDEF was ordered to collaborate with the heads of other Federal 
departments to incorporate security standards and information sharing requirements in order to 
provide classified information to critical infrastructure partners on a need-to-know basis. 
DHS - DoD Agreement  
As discussed previously, CISA has been established as the new primary agency dedicated to 
coordinating cyberattack response. However, two days prior to the announcement of creation of 
his agency, DHS and DoD signed an agreement, authorized under the NPPD, that solidified 
interagency cooperation and specifically outlined the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of 
each agency for joint cybersecurity efforts. While reaffirming that DHS remains the LFA 
regarding all cybersecurity efforts to protect critical infrastructure, the agreement also recognized 
that in order for DoD to fulfill its mission, including waging and winning wars, critical 
infrastructure must remain intact and provide the necessary resources.44  
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The agreement based the coordination between DHS and DoD on three primary objectives. The 
first objective is that both agencies will adopt a “threat-informed, risk-based approach” to ensure 
the delivery and function of critical infrastructure.44 This approach will streamline the mutual 
understanding between the two agencies to determine what constitutes a threat, why the threat is 
important, and the associated risks and how they should conduct the proper response. This 
mutual understanding will increase the efficiency and efficacy of resiliency and planning for 
defense against cyberattacks.  
The second objective requires DHS and DoD, with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the IC, to develop a common understanding of existing threats and 
disseminate this information to the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, which will 
allow the owners and operators to increase their own capacity for resilience and preparation 
against cyberattacks. Establishing this repository for information on existing threats and current 
capabilities, with the understanding that it was developed using language and facts that were 
agreed upon by all contributing parties, and providing the ability to access the information in a 
timely manner will allow for more confidence within critical infrastructure sectors.44  
The third objective is that DHS and DoD will each incorporate the individual strengths of the 
other agency, as necessary and appropriate, to supplement their own individual agency mission 
and provide for a more coordinated overall resilience. For example, the expertise that DHS has 
with respect to domestic response capabilities allows them to provide DoD with valuable 
information to inform DoD of the specific types of threats they could potentially encounter. 
Likewise, the new “defending forward” objective of the 2018 National Cyber strategy allows 
DoD to inform DHS on potential adversarial activity they could potentially face, specifically 
regarding critical infrastructure.44 
Department of Justice (DOJ) 
DOJ plays a variety of roles in cyberattack response and coordination. While DOJ does not 
assume the lead role in many of the documents that have been discussed, they do play a 
supporting role as outlined blow. Table 1-5 identifies the guidance documents under which DOJ 
has been given some level of authority for response to cyberattacks. 
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Table 1-5 DOJ Cyber Response Guidance Documents 
 
InfraGard 
Within the DOJ, the FBI plays the most prominent role in the protection of critical infrastructure 
through their InfraGard program. InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI (which falls under 
the DOJ) and members of the private sector. It is the responsibility of the DOJ to administer this 
program and stimulate public-private collaboration. As of November 2018, there were 
approximately 50,000 members of the InfraGard program, comprising representatives from all 
sixteen sectors of critical infrastructure.45  
Through this program, members of the private sector are afforded the opportunity to learn about 
current and emerging cyber threats that have been previously identified as the most serious for 
critical infrastructure, as well as those threats that are intensifying and require increased 
attention. This learning opportunity includes educational seminars and workshops, information-
sharing through federal government reports and assessments, threat advisories, vulnerability 
reports, and intelligence bulletins. Not only does this collaborative effort provide private entities 
a chance to streamline their information gathering processes, it also provides government entities 
a chance to review data and analysis from the private sector as well.  
NCIRP 
The NCIRP states that when an attack response is initiated, DOJ, through the FBI, is the LFA. 
Attack response activities can include investigative, forensic, and analytical activities, as well as 
the conducting of appropriate law enforcement and national security investigative activities. The 
DOJ offices of U.S. attorneys and criminal and National Security divisions work with Federal 
law enforcement agencies and use their authorities to disrupt and apprehend malicious cyber 
actors. 
 NCIRP NIPP DHS 
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NIPP 
The DOJ, including the FBI, is tasked with leading counterterrorism and counterintelligence 
investigations and related law enforcement activity across all sectors of critical infrastructure. It 
is the job of DOJ to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute threats or attempted attacks against the 
nation’s critical infrastructure. 
E0 13010 
Under this EO, the head of DOJ along with the heads of other Federal agencies should nominate 
two full time members to be on the commission that reports to the President. An IPTF within the 
DOJ was to be established, and to be chaired by the FBI. The IPTF was tasked with providing 
and coordinating the provision of critical infrastructure as well as issuing notifications of 
potential cyber threats and issuing direct warnings in the event of an attack.  
PPD-21 
Under PPD-21, DOJ was assigned to lead investigations and related law enforcement activities 
across all sectors of critical infrastructure. They are provided the same responsibilities as 
mentioned under the NIPP. 
PEO 13800 
PEO 13800 does not explicitly mention DOJ, but it does include the FBI. Under this PEO, the 
FBI is tasked with aiding in identifying the authorities and capabilities that agencies could 
employ to support cybersecurity efforts, as well as providing a report to the President that 
includes findings and recommendations for better supporting the cybersecurity risk management 
efforts of Section 9 entities. Additionally, the FBI should consult with other SSAs regarding 
cyber threat information sharing, response, capacity building, and cooperation.  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
ODNI oversees intelligence support and asset protection in the event of a cyberattack. 
Additionally, ODNI acts as the principal advisor to the President in many of the frameworks 
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currently in place for critical infrastructure protection. Table 1-6 identifies the frameworks under 
which ODNI has been specified direct responsibilities for response to cyberattacks.  
Table 1-6 ODNI Cyber Response Guidance Documents 
 
NCIRP 
Under the NCIRP, ODNI is designated as the LFA for intelligence support regarding cyberattack 
response, and is tasked with providing intelligence support to Federal agencies. If a cyberattack 
affects IC assets, ODNI manages the threat and asset response.  
NIPP 
Under the NIPP, the IC, led by ODNI, should use their authorities and mechanisms to assess 
threats to critical infrastructure and coordinate on intelligence and other information related to 
critical infrastructure. They should also oversee information security policies, guidelines and 
standards, and directives for safeguarding national security systems as directed by the President.  
NRF 
The NRF designates ODNI to serves head of the IC and act as the principal advisor to the 
President regarding intelligence matters. 
E0 13636 
This EO requires ODNI as well as others to issue instructions about their specific authorities 
regarding cyber threats. The instructions will address the need to protect intelligence and law 
enforcement sources, methods, operations, and investigations.  
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PPD-21 requires the Director of National Intelligence to use the authorities and appropriate 
coordination mechanisms to provide intelligence assessments regarding threats to critical 
infrastructure.  
PEO 13800 
PEO 13800 requires that for any National Security System, ODNI should work with other SSAs 
to provide a report and identify authorities and capabilities that agencies could use to support 
cybersecurity efforts. This document also requires ODNI to examine the capability of the U.S. to 
manage the potential consequences of an attack while identifying any potential gaps and 
shortcomings. 
State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments  
State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments form the backbone of the U.S. 
administrative power that coincides with the Federal Government. In the world of cybersecurity, 
SLTT governments play a key role in the protection of critical infrastructure. In most cases, 
SLTT governments act as first responders in the event of a cyberattack and do as much as they 
are able using their own resources, until the Federal Government is called upon to intercede. 
SLTT governments are cited in a variety of documents and agency missions that involve the 
protection of critical infrastructure, as outlined in Table 1-7. 
Table 1-7 SLTT Government Cyber Response Guidance Documents 
 
NCIRP 
The NCIRP stresses the importance of the cohesion between the Federal Government and SLTT 
governments regarding cybersecurity. The need for cohesion is exemplified within one of its 
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guiding principles, “Unity of Government Effort.” The plan places substantial focus and detail 
on SLTT governments, explaining their role in threat response, asset response, intelligence 
support, affected entity response, coordinating structures, and cyber operations.  
NIPP 
The NIPPP also focuses on the collaboration between SLTT governments, the Federal 
Government, and the private sector. The goals and expectations of SLTT governments are 
included throughout the document, detailing what they need to complete in order to protect 
critical infrastructure during a cyberattack. 
PPD-21 
PPD-21 establishes a need for partnership between all levels of government, but fails to provide 
SLTT governments with specific directions due to the document focusing more on the Federal 
Government. 
PPD-41 
PPD-41 makes even less mention of SLTT governments than PPD-21; they are only cited when 
the guiding principles and the effort to coordinate government actions are outlined.  
Guidance Document Analysis Scorecard 
In order to begin to understand the roles of the various government agencies and entities that are 
tasked with cybersecurity responsibilities for critical infrastructure, an analysis and 
understanding of current government documents that address these response mechanisms to a 
cyberattack is important. Throughout this chapter, each of the primary entities that play a role in 
protecting critical infrastructure have been outlined and analyzed under the documents in which 
they are referenced. Although this chapter only explicitly discusses six such entities, Table 1-8 
provides a comprehensive guide that identifies all the agencies, departments, and entities that 
play a role in cybersecurity for critical infrastructure and the governance and guidance 
documents in which they are included. This guide provides a visible representation of the overlap 
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between and the involvement within individual entities regarding cybersecurity and the lack of 
coordination between roles and responsibilities defined under the separate guidance documents.  
Due to the federalist structure of the U.S. government and the interconnection with the capitalist 
structure of the private sector, entities at all levels of government participate in a shared 
responsibility for ensuring the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure. This includes 





Table 1-8 Guidance Document Analysis Scorecard 
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DoJ                
ODNI                
SLTT                
SSAs                
DoS                
DoI                
DoC                
GSA                
NRC                
FCC                
FSRAs                
ACs                
PEs                
NIST                
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Table 1-8 Guidance Document Analysis Scorecard 
 


















               
CD                
ECD                
ISD                
NRMC                
FPS                
OFAs                
NSA                
Acs                
FBI                
CIA                
FEMA                
IPTF                
OMB                
NSC                
NCCIC                
NRMC                
FAV                
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Limitations and Recommendations  
One of the primary issues that the government must address regarding its role in cybersecurity is 
a lack of consistency between the various strategies, plans, and documents that guide 
cybersecurity efforts. Each government agency has been tasked with a specific mission to protect 
critical infrastructure and must assume a different, unique role in attack response. However, in 
the event of a cyberattack all agencies will be required to work together in order to address the 
attack, mitigate the potential damages, and provide recovery assistance. The NCIRP clearly 
outlines the roles for threat and asset response. However, the NIPP also outlines threat response 
roles for attacks that target critical infrastructure. The NIPP is not discussed or mentioned in the 
NCIRP, and the NCIRP is not mentioned in the NIPP. Since both are guidance documents, as 
opposed to official government statutes, there arises the potential issue for determining which 
document supersedes the other during attack response, and therefore the distinct and unique roles 
and responsibilities of the participating agencies for a single, fully coordinated attack response 
has not been established. This presents the potential for confusion in the event of a cyberattack.  
The current NIPP outlines the collaboration between government and private sector entities that 
are involved directly with critical infrastructure to manage risks and meet security or resilience 
goals with respect to cybersecurity. However, the “current” NIPP was issued in 2013 and is 
considered out-of-date compared to the reality of the state of current cyber threats and the 
relationship between the agencies that have tasked with protecting critical infrastructure. Also, 
the NIPP is the only strategy developed to specifically protect critical infrastructure.41 This 
changed after the passage of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act in 
November 2018.9 The new agency that was created through this act, CISA, is directed to lead the 
national effort to protect critical infrastructure while working with government and private sector 
partners. However, with this being a relatively new agency, all aspects of its functions and 
operations have not yet been finalized.   
It must also be acknowledged that the current cyberattack response frameworks, strategies, and 
guidance documents were developed under different presidential administrations, which means 
they will likely reflect different administrative goals, aspirations, strategies, and plans for 
cybersecurity. The NRF, NCIRP, and NIPP were all issued during the Obama Administration, 
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while the most recent DHS CS was developed by the Trump Administration. Competing 
domestic and international policies, including those for defense and attack response, will result in 
language changing between similar documents released under different administrations, 
especially administrations of different political parties. The language of newer documents may 
completely contradict that of older documents. When new frameworks, strategies, and guidance 
documents are developed without clear reference to previous, similar documents, an issue arises 
of which document should take precedence during an attack. If the language is directly 
contradictory, this will further complicate the ability for adequate response. 
Based on the research conducted on the current laws, policies, strategies, frameworks, and 
guidance documents that discuss cybersecurity and cyber incident response, the primary 
recommendation of this chapter of the report is for CISA to create a single, comprehensive 
plan/strategy for cyberattack response regarding critical infrastructure that supersedes all other 
critical infrastructure cyberattack response guidance documents. Due to the establishment of 
CISA as the new central agency that handles cyber infrastructure matters exclusively, this agency 
should be responsible for producing a guiding document for cyberattack response and mitigation. 
This document should include an attack handbook that aligns with the 2018 National Cyber 
Strategy and the 2018 National Security Strategy and should be continuously updated to include 
the most accurate data and information for effective cyberattack response.  
Additionally, each SSA will be required to update their individual cyberattack response plans to 
reflect and expand upon what is included in the new CISA document. This puts each individual 
sector of critical infrastructure in concurrence with the direction of the central authority and 
streamlines the individual response mechanisms for each sector. Lastly, through incorporating 
the updates and changes issued by CISA, the cyber infrastructure sections in each of the existing 
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The Private Sector's Role in Cybersecurity 
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Acknowledging the importance of the government’s role in securing the nation’s critical 
infrastructure while understanding that most of this infrastructure is privately owned and/or 
operated is the first step in developing an appropriate national framework for comprehensive 
cybersecurity. A private sector entity is any organization or business that is not directly under 
government control; however, this can include government contractors or universities that do 
receive government funding.  
A vital aspect of the current environment of cybersecurity requires understanding the role that 
the private sector has in this development. The government has historically outsourced the 
provision of public services to the private sector in an effort to be more cost effective and to 
provide higher quality services.1 The use of public-private partnerships as a form of outsourcing 
began in the late 18th and early 19th centuries when the United States (U.S.) government sought 
to increase private sector participation in the development of public roads.1 Additionally, 
growing discontent with the government during the 1960s increased privatization for other public 
services as well, including prisons, charter schools, and information technology (IT) services.2 
Similar to the provision of other public goods, such as the Internet, the private sector can be 
utilized to outsource “cyber maintenance” for the government. In fact, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has already started this trend: DoD spent approximately $390 million in 2015 to 
outsource the creation of new cyber weapon technology to government contractors.3,4 Utilizing 
the private sector for innovation and security is becoming more important due to the 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure as a result of the interconnectedness of the Internet.   
This chapter discusses the crucial position both the government and private sector occupy in 
providing cybersecurity for critical infrastructure. Each has instituted different standards for 
protecting against, mitigating the impact of, and assessing the potential for cyberattacks. These 
differences demonstrate a need for a more unified approach to cybersecurity, to benefit the 
private sector as well as the government. Additionally, different levels of cyberattack reporting 
and the variety of stakeholders in the private sector make up an overarching theme of a public-
private partnership, demonstrating the complexity and difficulty of the current process. This 
chapter will further examine the unique situations that the private sector experiences when 
defending against cyber threats, considering both small and large businesses, and discusses 
potential conflicts regarding jurisdiction and cyberattack reporting that exist between the private 
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sector and the government. These issues have the potential to disrupt effective, unified 
cybersecurity; this chapter reviews these issues and recommends solutions.  
The Private Sector and Critical Infrastructure 
The private sector in the U.S. comprises over 30 million companies that employ 91% of 
American workers, and 99% of these companies are small businesses with less than 500 
employees.5 Regardless of the size, function, or mission of each organization, cybersecurity 
constitutes a concern for every business in the private sector. Private sector organizations are 
increasingly using the advantages of the digital world to collect, process, and store large amounts 
of data, including employee records, customer information, and internal operations information. 
While the benefits of cyber technologies have allowed private sector organizations to capitalize 
on advancements, including the Internet of Things (IoT), big data, cloud services, and other 
emerging technologies, it has also led to the development of a new set of security concerns that 
companies were not previously prepared to address.6 The proliferation and increasing 
sophistication of cyber criminals and malicious actors increases the vulnerability of digital data 
to cyberattacks, and companies must consider the practical and economic considerations for 
mitigating the risk to digital data storage.  
Within this context, it is important to reiterate that the majority of critical infrastructure is owned 
and/or operated by private sector organizations.7 This is important as the practical and economic 
considerations for cybersecurity within the private sector must account for protecting data and 
information that belong to private organizations as well as for those elements of critical 
infrastructure over which the government has a vested interest in protecting. Private sector 
organizations are involved in the ownership and operation of every sector of critical 
infrastructure including major soles in the financial, energy, communications, food, and 
agriculture, and healthcare sectors.7 
Protocol for Data Security 
The major authority for the regulation of data storage and cybersecurity in the U.S. resides 
within the guidelines promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act gave the FTC the authority to investigate “unfair and deceptive 
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acts and practices in or affecting commerce,” which the FTC has interpreted to include data 
security and protection.8 This has allowed the FTC to exercise authority in monitoring the 
security of data stored within private sector organizations.9 Using this authority, the FTC has 
promulgated documents that guide private sector organizations to implement data storage and 
cybersecurity measures; however, these documents do not constitute enforceable requirements. 
Specifically, the FTC has provided a series of recommendations for data security that encourage 
businesses to protect customer data that include: establishing a secure, robust cybersecurity 
system; implementing relevant cybersecurity protocol training for employees; emphasizing the 
importance of not sharing passwords; and creating internal cybersecurity and data security 
manager position.10 While implementing these recommendations will no doubt improve 
cybersecurity none are legally mandatory.10  
One area for which the Federal Government has specific laws regarding data protection is for 
healthcare. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, the 
Federal Government officially recognized the sensitive nature of personal health data by 
instituting enforceable regulations to address the proper and secure storage and handling of this 
type of data.11 HIPAA was enacted in response to the emergence of technologies that could allow 
medical records to be portable through electronic means.12 This portability was intended to allow 
for easier sharing of information among the various health care providers and institutions a 
patient may visit. A second important aspect of HIPAA was a guarantee for the security of a 
patient’s medical records.13 Increasing the electronic portability of patient records created the 
potential for an increased risk of unauthorized access. The provisions contained within HIPAA 
require that patient records be made more easily accessible, but also more secure. The Act also 
requires that explicit permission is required for any individual, other than the individual to whom 
that information belongs, to access that information, and outlines the protocol for addressing any 
breach or other unauthorized access of the information.11 The proliferation of the Internet and the 
prevalence of cyber threats has further required HIPAA to be used as the legal authority that 
requires medical information to be protected against cyberattacks. 
Similar Federally-mandated data protection requirements have been established for the financial 
sector as well. Under the Financial Modernization Act of 1999, commonly referred to as the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), financial institutions are required to provide a “reasonable 
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level of security” for data and to define the process by which a data breach must be reported.14 
The provisions of the GLBA were intended, in part, to ensure that financial institutions were 
protecting the confidentiality of their customer’s personal information.15 However, the act is not 
specifically tailored to the capabilities of modern technology, because technology has advanced 
to include capabilities that were not even imagined when the act was drafted. Additionally, the 
act is vague in defining what constitutes a “reasonable level of security,” ultimately allowing 
financial institutions to adopt security measures they consider “reasonable.”15 Additionally, the 
breach reporting mechanism established by the act has proven hard to enforce due to companies 
not sharing when a breach has occurred. While the act was a step in the right direction when it 
was introduced, it lacks the technical details required to adapt to evolving data security 
concerns.15 
In addition to HIPAA, GLBA, and the FTC guidelines, there are some state laws that address 
cybersecurity and data protection. Currently, 24 states have passed legislation affecting the 
private sector that require some form of data protection.16 Each state legislation has different 
requirements and focuses on different aspects within the field of data protection. For instance, in 
Texas, Business & Commerce Code § 521.052 requires business and nonprofit sports 
associations that collect personal data to provide “reasonable procedures” to protect this data. In 
California, Civil Code § 1798.91.04 requires manufacturers of connected devices to equip these 
devices with reasonable security features to protect any data they may collect, contain, or 
transmit against unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. In Colorado, 
House Bill 18-1128 requires entities that collect data to develop written policies for the disposal 
of personal information when it is no longer needed. While there is a general principle for 
requiring businesses to implement and maintain reasonable cybersecurity procedures and provide 
an avenue for legal corrective action, the specific requirement differences between individual 
state legislation showcase the lack of uniformity between states.16 Additionally, the number of 
states with legislation specifically requiring data security has doubled between 2016 and 2018 
showing an increased focus on this type of legislation, and that more is likely to come in the 
future.16  
While data protection laws in the U.S. remain limited and vague, the European Union (EU) has 
made strides to strengthen cybersecurity and data protection measures and to provide more strict 
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enforcement for failing to comply. The most recent, and comprehensive, of these efforts is the 
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which was passed into law in 2016 and 
became enforceable in 2018.17 The GDPR establishes that the right to personal data collected by 
companies belongs to the individual from whom that data is collected, and requires entities that 
collect, process, or disseminate that data to provide appropriate security measures to safeguard 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data.18 The law sets a fine of 20 million euros 
or 4% of an entity’s global sales, whichever is greater, for violation or noncompliance.19 
Though the GDPR is an EU law, its jurisdiction extends beyond the physical borders of the EU. 
Any company in the world that collects data on an EU citizen and fails to comply with the 
regulation can be prosecuted by the EU.19 Thus, the law directly affects U.S. organizations that 
collect data when an individual visits the organization’s website. Many companies that reach 
international customers have updated their privacy statements to comply with the provisions of 
the GDPR.17 And while most large businesses have not experienced compliance issues and have 
deemed the required changes to be reasonable, small business have struggled due to the 
complexity of the regulation and the additional need for understanding the impacts of storing 
data now complicated by the geographic locations of users.17 While the disparity in data storage 
policies has decreased by an estimated 20%, there still remains a large disparity between the 
current outcomes and the intention of increasing the security of customer data.18 It remains to be 
seen if the GDPR will result in the implementation of increased levels of security in the private 
sector. 
In addition to the regulations discussed above, private sector organizations that contract or intend 
to contract with any part of the Federal Government have additional regulations with which they 
must comply. The Defense Security Service (DSS) was developed to foster partnerships and 
innovation between the Federal Government and the private sector by providing security risk 
management and professional development.20 The DSS evaluates contractors who apply for 
government contracts and determines if they meet the security requirements to do government 
work. To qualify for basic consideration, the contractor and all of their subcontractors must 
comply with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 252.204-7012, which requires contractors 
to implement data security in accordance with the standards provided in the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171. These standards provide the 
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“basic” security controls for contractor information systems.20 The policy further details the 
conditions that a contractor must pass to be considered eligible for government work. These 
requirements ensure that a private sector contractor that may be granted access to controlled 
government information is following proper data security. 
Data Security Disparities 
The differences between large and small businesses, particularly financial differences, require 
different considerations for cybersecurity. Small businesses are categorized as those that have 
fewer than 500 employees and/or make less than $7.5 million in average annual receipts.21 Due 
to the limited resources of many small businesses, they are inhibited from investing in the same 
types of cybersecurity measures that large businesses can afford to purchase or create in-house. 
However, despite the lack of resources, small businesses must protect their data in the same 
manner as large businesses. This has allowed for a market to open for the sale of a range of cyber 
defense systems that companies can purchase and implement, as opposed to creating in-house 
systems.  
Implementation of cybersecurity systems is not normally a concern for small business owners 
when they first start their business, so many have no form of cyber defense systems, and those 
that do generally use generic systems available on the free market.22 This becomes an issue when 
a small business experiences a data breach. Studies show that 31% of cyberattacks target small 
businesses, and 60% of those that suffer a data breach fail within six months because they cannot 
make up the damages.23 Unless there is an increased focus on investing cybersecurity systems, 
small businesses may find it difficult to endure as cyberattacks become more prolific and severe. 
By contrast, large businesses, especially technology companies, possess the assets and 
capabilities to develop their own cyber defense systems, and most deploy these systems for data 
protection. However, while large businesses do have the capacity to protect their data, the current 
economic incentive system does not necessarily incentivize them to do so.22 In a 2014 attack, 
suspected to have been conducted by North Korea in response to the film The Interview, Sony 
spent approximately $35 million to address the attack and recover lost property.23 The attack 
consisted of a worm that was designed to listen to and extract data from private phone 
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conversations that were happening within the company, access employees’ personal information, 
and copy and destroy company records.24 After accounting for cyber insurance payments to 
compensate for the losses and advertisement revenues from the film (which grossed more than 
$40 million), the overall impact of the attack was minuscule considering that Sony’s annual 
revenue is estimated around $68 billion.23,25  
This outcome was similar for the 2013 Target and Home Depot data breaches. Both Target and 
Home Depot lost less than 2% of their profits: Target lost $105 million compared to $72.5 billion 
in sales, while Home Depot lost $28 million compared to $17.7 billion in profit.26,27 The Target 
attack occurred due to a heating, ventilating, and air conditioning subcontractor that had been the 
target of a malware intrusion that allowed hackers to collect personal information and credit card 
numbers from transactions as customers check-out.28 The Home Depot attack occurred in a 
similar manner, despite the fact that Home Depot had an opportunity to learn from the Target 
attack to consider its own potential vulnerabilities. In this instance, the breach occurred due to 
the theft of third-party vendor credentials that allowed access to credit card information during 
check-out transactions.29 Ultimately, the “loss” that each of these companies suffered was 
minimized by cyber insurance claims and the enormous profit-to-loss ratio.  
This financial "resilience” of large businesses against cyberattacks creates a disincentive to 
commit a substantial investment in cybersecurity. JPMorgan Chase reportedly spends $250 
million on data security each year, which represents only 0.35% of the company’s annual 
expenses.22 As a banking and investment firm, where protecting customer information and 
money is vital for business operations, spending such a small portion of the budget on 
cybersecurity illustrates that large businesses may not currently consider cyber threats as a 
significant business concern. However, this is not uncommon: Bank of American spends $400 
million on cybersecurity, which is less than 1% of their operating budget.30,31 Even Microsoft, a 
company specifically devoted to producing computer technology, spends just $1 billion on 
cybersecurity, which comprises approximately 6% of their operating budget.32,33 These 
expenditures indicate that the incentive for large companies to invest more in cyber defense 
systems is limited as cyberattack have demonstrated minimal potential impact to overall profits. 
These companies may also not consider cybersecurity a major investment need as they possess 
the financial capacity to recover after a major breach. 
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Reporting Cyber Incidents and Public-Private Relations  
In April 2018, the governments of the U.S. and the United Kingdom (UK) jointly issued a 
warning of Russian efforts into malicious cyber activities, which was disseminated among 
government agencies as well as to the private sector. Many of the potential targets of these 
efforts were assumed to be critical infrastructure.34 The cyberattack reporting protocol between 
the private sector and the government is neither cohesive nor straightforward. Open-source 
research has yielded very little published information regarding the historic reporting structure or 
jurisdictional boundaries between the government and the private sector specifically for 
cybersecurity. However, due to an increase in cyberattacks specifically targeting the private 
sector, establishing a formal reporting structure and the jurisdictional boundaries for 
cybersecurity is vital to protect U.S. activities in cyberspace.  
Private-to-Federal Reporting Protocol 
One of the most significant issues that the private sector faces after a cyberattack has occurred is 
the lack of a formal protocol by which to report the incident to the Federal Government. While 
the U.S. government provides the private sector with guidance and advice, most companies 
either do not know how to correctly report an incident or choose not to report.35,36 Each 
individual Federal agency has a different way in which they request the private sector reports an 
incident. 
The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) requests that private sector 
organizations submit reports of cyberattacks to the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC). The NCCIC evaluates the attack for functional, informational, and 
potential impact, recoverability, location of observed activity, actor characterization, and cross-
sector dependency.37 Since the NCCIC serves as the national hub for cybersecurity and is located 
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), they currently report attacks to the 
appropriate government agency responsible for each sector of critical infrastructure.  
DHS also accomplishes reporting with the private sector by utilizing Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISACs). ISACs are nonprofit organizations, comprising members of the 
private sector including critical infrastructure owners and operators, that are tasked with 
 72 
 
information sharing processes with the government.38 ISACs can improve cybersecurity within 
the private sector by increasing cyber resiliency through sharing best practices, joint research, 
and increase project funding.39 While ISACs help with information sharing, their utilization does 
not necessarily increase reporting of cyber incidents. DHS also has a unified guideline for when 
and to whom the private sector should report a cyberattack. This guideline encourages the private 
sector to report the cyberattack to Federal authorities if the attack:40 
 Results in a significant loss of data, system availability, or system control; 
 Impacts a large number of victims; 
 Indicates unauthorized access to or malicious present within critical infrastructure 
technology systems; 
 Affects critical infrastructure or core government functions; 
 Impacts national security, economic security, or public health and safety. 
The DHS cyberattack reporting guideline is similar to the cybersecurity guidelines developed by 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), which focus primarily on prevention. However, in the event of 
a cyberattack, DOJ has implemented an easy-to-follow reporting procedure that requires private 
sector organizations to make initial assessment, implement measures to minimize damage, record 
and collect information, and notify within the organization as well as to federal responders.41 
Within DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is specifically responsible for combatting 
foreign cyberattacks and threats. The FBI currently disseminates information of potential threats 
or targets to the private sector, but is seeking to have an embedded information sharing system 
with the private sector.42 Moving forward, more thorough cooperation between federal 
authorities and the private sector is essential for reporting cyber issues.    
In 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became the first government 
entity to officially advise private sector organizations on how to properly report cyberattacks by 
recommending that these organizations advise their investors when an attack occurs. As a result, 
twenty-four organizations reported cyberattacks to the SEC in 2017, though it is estimated that 
nearly 5,000 experienced some form of a cyberattack in the same period.35 In 2018 the SEC 
further advised companies to also publicly disclose any information regarding cyberattacks.35,43 
However, publicly disclosing that a cyberattack has occurred could display a company’s internal 
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vulnerabilities, thereby providing competitors with the opportunity to address any cybersecurity 
system failures without displaying their own vulnerabilities.44 Thus, companies are reluctant to 
report cyberattacks for fear of losing customers or investors, of facing legal liability, or of the 
potential damage to their stock value, or simply because they deem it to not be in the company's 
best interest to report.45,44  
Despite the reluctance to report a cyberattack, the private sector believes it is more equipped to 
defend against cyberattacks than the government; consequently, the government outsources 
much of its cybersecurity to the private sector, which in turn makes the private sector a more 
susceptible target for cyberattacks.46,47 Some within the private sector believe that government 
should not restrict the private sector in how they respond to cyber incidents.48,49 Not only do 
large businesses in the private sector possess a preponderance of tools to protect themselves, they 
are also capable of a more rapid response, including the ability to more quickly and accurately 
identify those responsible for the attack.48   
Private to State/Local Reporting Protocol and Capabilities 
Similar to the jurisdictional structure for emergencies and natural disasters specified in the 
National Response Framework (NRF) (discussed in Chapter 1), state and local governments have 
the initial responsibility for response in the event of a cyberattack. State and local governments 
can request assistance from the Federal Government if their own resources are insufficient to 
provide an adequate response. Private sector organizations report an attack to either state or local 
authorities, who in turn report the incident to the appropriate Lead Federal Agency (LFA).50 
However, state and local governments often lack the adequate tools and resources to rapidly 
address cyber incident response, losing valuable time as the information moves slowly up the 
chain of command.51,52 Some states have created a central state agency that works with both 
internal and external stakeholders to combat cyberattacks, while other states are simply 
outsourcing cyber-related issues, including reporting, to contractors in the private sector.53 This 
model is common among states with established programs, including Arizona, California, 
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.54 While establishing a 
central agency for state and local governments can be beneficial, there is currently no clear path 
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that allows state and local governments to work directly with the private sector to respond to a 
cyberattack.  
As of late 2018, the cyber capabilities of individual states have been expanded to meet emerging 
cyber threats.54 However, most of the expanded capabilities are still in the preliminary stage. 
States have traditionally combated these threats primarily through assets like security tools and 
technology plans.54 However, only 17-21% of state and local government executives believe that 
they have the tools necessary to detect cybersecurity issues or adequately trained staff to respond 
to them.55 Moreover, 25% of local executives believe they are lacking the funding to ensure their 
own security.55 This leads to the current reporting structure between state and local governments 
and the private sector not being conducive to the nature of cyberattacks. 
Cyberattack Response Issues: Jurisdiction and Capabilities 
The government is frequently confronted with an inability to properly respond to cyberattacks 
due to jurisdictional issues, the timeliness required for an adequate response, or issues relating to 
attribution. In instances where the government is unable to provide an adequate response to a 
cyberattack, the private sector may question the government’s cybersecurity capabilities and may 
instead attempt to address the attack themselves. For example, utilizing the hacking back tactic 
allows private companies to hack the malicious cyber actor(s) who are hacking their system, in 
real time, to either retrieve stolen data or to retaliate. This can be accomplished using 
cybersecurity personnel or through software that is designed to hack back when it senses a 
threat.56,57  
However, using hacking back as a defensive tactic presents the potential for serious issues 
between the U.S. and its allies or adversaries. If a private U.S. company hacked back in response 
to a cyberattack, and in the process encountered sensitive information or destroyed connections 
that belong to a foreign government entity, there could be substantial diplomatic repercussions. It 
is currently illegal for the private sector to hack back, due to a large margin of error on locating 
the hacker.58  
Additionally, there is the potential that hacking back could itself be used maliciously; a private 
company could hack a competitor under the false pretense that they were utilizing hacking back 
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as defense against a cyber incident.58 These issues demonstrate the need for the government and 
the private sector to jointly develop a more coordinated and effective system with which to 
respond to cyberattacks against the private sector. While it is still illegal for private companies to 
hack back, legislation to allow private sector organizations to actively defend themselves against 
cyber threats, using tactics similar to hacking back, is continually (but thus far unsuccessfully) 
introduced in Congress.59 The Pentagon has warned that the private sector should not have the 
ability to conduct offensive hacking; however, the DoD is open to the private sector having more 
robust cyber defense systems. This can become contentious when determining which capabilities 
are considered defensive and which are considered offensive.60 With the right defense systems 
and personnel in place, both the government and the private sector can be adequately equipped to 
defend their respective systems against cyberattacks. 
Another problem the government faces regarding cybersecurity is an inability to recruit and 
retain qualified employees. DoD often trains employees who after a time leave to join the private 
sector for higher paying jobs. As a result, DoD fills these much-needed positions with 
underqualified or under skilled candidates.61 A former Chief Architect and Special Advisor for 
Cybersecurity for DHS describes the recruitment process for cybersecurity as slow-moving and 
flawed in enticing qualified people to apply for the positions.62 To attempt to resolve these 
issues, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has implemented a system of flexibility 
regarding compensation for certain cybersecurity positions, with the understanding that there 
may need to be additional incentives to retain qualified employees.63 Despite OPM’s efforts, 
these complications provide further proof that the government and the private sector need a 
strengthened, collaborative effort to ensure that the best minds are fulfilling the nation’s need for 
comprehensive cybersecurity. While considerations for security clearance and the need-to-know 
status present potential issues related to information sharing, there is no appropriate solution 
without changing the clearance process and implementing it government-wide.  
Another issue that inhibits progress to create stronger coordination between the government and 
the private sector is information sharing. The current process by which information is shared 
between separate government entities is subpar and worse between defense agencies or private 
contractors. This occurs when certain material is classified or designated as “need-to–know,” 
which prevents the Intelligence Community (IC) from truly sharing best practices for 
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cybersecurity with the private sector.61 The IC uses DHS to provide information-sharing with 
critical infrastructure stakeholders, to some success. As an example, the Food and Agriculture 
Sector integrated information regarding critical infrastructure with that of DHS to provide a more 
unified information-sharing environment with the other sectors of critical infrastructure.64 
However, this current framework is only advantageous for sharing information between critical 
infrastructure sectors, and not with all stakeholders in the private sector. This can potentially 
leave small business, hospitals, and other inherently governmental organizations (government 
contractors and universities) vulnerable. This vulnerability can create an opportunity for a new 
public-private partnerships to be used on a large scale for the other issues of employee 
retainment and information sharing.  
Use of Government Contractors and Universities in Cybersecurity  
While jurisdiction and reporting issues restrict the private sector regarding cyberattack response, 
the Federal Government does not have the legal right to use the armed forces as law enforcement 
within the U.S., as prohibited under the Posse Comitatus Act (further discussed in Chapter 3). 
The private sector can fill the void created by this restriction through the use of government 
contractors or universities. Both government contractors and universities use government grants 
or contracts to either provide a service to the government or use these funds to foster more 
innovation through research. Government contractors are vulnerable in that they have to abide by 
similar standards that government agencies have, without also having access to the same 
information as the government. Universities, on the other hand, are a great resource to foster new 
talent for the government to meet the needs of a growing cyber field by being at the forefront of 
new research and innovation.  
Government contractors, as discussed previously, have often been a great resource for 
government outsourcing.  Contractors are required by the U.S. government to develop and 
submit cybersecurity risk management plans for their companies to the government. This has 
allowed for better partnerships between the government and contractors.65 Contractors are held 
to the same standards because the government considers protecting government information a 
main priority. As contractors often have possession of government information, they are 
responsible for protecting it.66 If the government intends to outsource more of its security to 
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contractors, the government needs to be prepared to take responsibility if the contractors fail to 
protect government information. Government contractors, however, have the ability to retain 
more qualified employees than the government by having a competitive salary, and they often 
look to universities to recruit qualified employees.  
Another potential partner to address cybersecurity issues is the higher education system. Much of 
the new innovation for competition starts in universities. According to a 2017 report released by 
the Institute for Information Security & Privacy at Georgia Tech, computer science programs at 
universities across the U.S. are experiencing a record number of applicants. This massive influx 
of potential computer science graduates will be needed to fill new cybersecurity jobs, the number 
of which increased by 91% between 2010 and 2014. As such, universities are attempting to 
utilize the most cutting-edge technologies to teach these students in order to create the most well- 
educated workforce.67 Universities become an important stakeholder in U.S. cybersecurity by 
providing the educational training for students who will eventually be filling these high-demand 
positions. Community colleges have utilized certification and standard skills tests to assist 
potential employers in identifying the most qualified candidates.68 If the government and 
universities work together, they can educate, train, and employ highly proficient and competent 
cybersecurity professionals.   
Partnering with the government is advantageous for universities when considering the issue of 
intellectual property theft. Intellectual property is defined as “creations of the mind, such as 
inventions; literary and artistic works; designs; and symbols, names and images used in 
commerce.”69 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s armed forces, poses a significant 
threat to intellectual property. The PLA has created its own government agency, the Strategic 
Support Force (SSF), which is equivalent to U.S. Cyber Command. The goal of the SSF is to 
surpass the capabilities of the U.S. in all things cyber-related.70 Through the SSF, China has 
become one of the largest threats to the intellectual property of U.S. companies. China has 
already targeted universities and defense contractors, including Duke University and Lockheed-
Martin, to steal scientific research, defense secrets, and intellectual property.71,72 
Protecting intellectual property is becoming a bigger issue for both the government and the 
private sector, as most threats to intellectual property can be attributed to competitors wanting to 
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use the information for new jobs or projects.73 While the U.S. has established corporate 
espionage laws that prohibit competitors from stealing information, it is hard to implement the 
same concepts of enforcement and law internationally in regards to intellectual property and 
cybersecurity.74 This leads to international implications of unfair competition from overseas 
competitors and nation-states stealing technology or trade secrets, which both have consequences 
on the ability of the U.S. to compete and maintain economic stability.   
With intellectual property issues becoming more apparent, universities need to “lock-down” their 
research and skills-based information.75 Recognizing the importance of the role of the private 
sector, and universities in particular, in intellectual property security is important for the 
government to implement a public-private partnership.74 It is important to establish a public-
private partnership that allows for protection of university intellectual property while also 
fostering new talent for government jobs.  
Limitations  
While this research indicates that the private sector can address some of the deficiencies of the 
government regarding cybersecurity and cyberattack response, there are limitations that 
influence the findings of this report. All of the information included in this chapter has been 
obtained through publicly-available sources. There may be more substantial information 
regarding existing public-private partnerships that the government utilizes or the full 
cybersecurity capabilities of the government or the private sector that have not been publicly 
disclosed. However, without access to this information it cannot be evaluated against the 
findings in this chapter.  
There are also limitations as to what the private sector can and should currently be able to do in 
terms of cyberattack response. Government contractors are often restricted in that they must 
abide by the government standards for cybersecurity, particularly those of DoD, without also 
having access to the full breadth of information that DoD and the government has obtained 
regarding cyber threats.76 Additionally, when the private sector takes cybersecurity into their 
own hands, as discussed above, there can be larger, political consequences.57 The private sector 
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should not be able to respond to cyberattacks without proper information sharing with the 
government.    
Additionally, there are limitations related to the ability of the private sector and the government 
to provide adequate cyberattack response. In the case of both the government and the private 
sector, the origin of the incident is critical when determining the appropriate jurisdiction for a 
response. In the case of the 2014 Sony attack, the U.S. government identified the North Korean 
government as the probable source of the attack and responded with financial sanctions against 
North Korea. This demonstrated that the Federal Government is willing to respond to an attack 
against the private sector the same way it would respond to any other “action under the law of 
armed conflict.”77,78,79 It does not appear that Sony took any action in this incident.  
While there are many restrictions and vulnerabilities that the private sector must consider, there 
are ways in which the private sector can compensate for deficiencies in the government’s 
capabilities and work with the government to secure U.S. corporate and government interests. 
Future research should be conducted to examine the length at which the private sector should be 
allowed to go to respond to cyberattacks. The government should directly support further 
research into private sector capabilities to facilitate better contracting mechanisms and improve 
the sharing of best practices. Additionally, the private sector can be used to foster more 
innovation for cybersecurity through universities, a public-private partnership, and large 
businesses. Innovation can help the U.S. in the future to compete with peers and near-peers at a 
more advanced level. While these are important considerations for the future of cybersecurity, it 
is outside of the scope of this paper to investigate and describe them in greater depth.  
Recommendations and Conclusion 
The research demonstrates that the private sector, through restrictions set by the government and 
lack of cybersecurity practices, is vulnerable to cyber incidents. However, the capabilities and 
flexibility of the private sector impart a greater ability to respond to cyberattacks and incidents 
than the government, as much of the critical infrastructure is privately-owned. This study 
provides two recommendations regarding cybersecurity capabilities for the private sector: 
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reinforcement mechanisms for small businesses, which are the most vulnerable to cyber threats; 
and a new public-private partnership for cybersecurity.  
Small Business Reinforcement   
The research shows there is a need for the government to adjust its current policies and 
regulations to better protect small businesses and incentivize large businesses to maintain robust 
cybersecurity systems. The disparity between the current levels of protection and the availability 
to recover from an incident provide an adequate rationale for government intervention.  
One of the major disparities between small and large businesses is the use of cyber insurance. 
While cyber insurance is available to any business, only about 31% of all U.S. businesses 
currently own cyber insurance, and only 19% of small businesses.21,80 Cyber insurance provides 
compensation for monetary losses incurred as a result of a cyberattack, as long as the company 
has met the basic cybersecurity standards imposed by cyber insurers.81 Such a policy could help 
save small businesses from closing as a result of a cyberattack. For large companies, cyber 
insurance provides a disincentive to invest in the development and implementation of robust 
cyber defense systems, as their financial losses can be miniscule compared to total revenues and 
profits and can be recovered through insurance claims. This creates a potential moral hazard in 
that companies may act riskier because they know any losses due to a cyberattack will be 
minimized by the insurance. Additionally, the costs of cyber insurance continues to increase as 
more companies make claims against attacks, which can further disincentives businesses, 
especially small businesses with fewer financial resources, from purchasing it.80 Government 
intervention in the provision of cyber insurance may be able to restore the market to encourage 
small businesses to purchase insurance and discourage large businesses from taking advantage of 
such a program. 
In addition to adjustments in addressing current cyber insurance policies, the government needs 
to also determine the most appropriate course of action for providing cyber defense to both large 
and small businesses. The current FTC recommendations for cybersecurity implementation in the 
private sector are not legally enforceable, and therefore are not implemented by enough 
companies to fully protect the private sector.10 Most companies are not accustomed to providing 
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their own internal crime defense systems, relying instead on local or Federal law enforcement. 
This reliance on outside sources may extend to a company’s attitude toward cybersecurity. With 
cyber crime, however, there currently is no corresponding method of law enforcement protection 
and companies may be unsure how to appropriately address the situation.41 Companies are also 
discouraged from investigating attacks on their own, especially given that an attack could arise 
from overseas, and there is fear among corporate executives that reporting a cyberattack to the 
government will become public and they will lose public support, negatively impacting them 
financially. Additionally, the current system for reporting cyber incidents is not clear with 
respect to proper reporting protocol, jurisdiction for response, and the likelihood of a response. 
In light of these concerns, as well as the lack of federal law requiring that breaches be reported, 
companies can continue to operate without reporting when a breach has occurred.35,36 These 
issues coalesce to create a sense of insecurity within the private sector regarding cybersecurity 
and cyberattack response. This insecurity could be addressed through the development of new 
laws, regulation, and/or developments in cyber defense systems.  
Public-Private Partnership 
The research shows that there is a strong need for a public-private partnership for cybersecurity 
due to deficiencies in cybersecurity and cyberattack response in both the government and the 
private sector. The first aspect regarding cybersecurity in which the government is deficient is 
job fulfillment and retainment, as it must directly compete with the private sector for the most 
qualified candidates. The private sector provides higher potential salaries for employment in 
cybersecurity, forcing the government to fill cybersecurity jobs with individuals who are under-
qualified or unqualified.61 One way in which a public-private partnership can benefit the 
government is through a job training program in which the government works with the private 
sector to provide training and establish direct hiring paths to transition professionals from the 
private sector into government cybersecurity positions. To accommodate this transition, the 
government may need to provide a more competitive salary to complement the program.  
However, due to budgetary constraints and considerations, the government may not be able to 
provide a salary level that allows them to directly compete with the private sector. As a result, 
the government could shift its focus from recruiting for cybersecurity positions to outsourcing 
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these capabilities, which could potentially be a more cost-effective method. One way in which 
cybersecurity could be effectively outsourced, that would be most beneficial to the government, 
would be to have the private sector develop and manage the cybersecurity systems for critical 
infrastructure, small businesses, and local government security, which represent the areas most in 
need for improved cyber defense systems.   
Outsourcing cannot be efficiently achieved, however, if the government is not willing to fully 
share cyber threat information with the private sector. The foundation for an effective public-
private partnership is contingent on the information flow from one sector the other. While the 
private sector may be more equipped at handling cybersecurity, an information-sharing 
mechanism should be utilized to share best practices between the sectors. Also, since 
government cyberattack response is known to be slow, establishing an information-sharing 
mechanism could potentially decrease the disparity between when a cyberattack occurs and the 
time it takes to respond.  
A public-private information-sharing mechanism can best be implemented through Fusion 
Centers located across the country. Fusion Centers are defined as a “collaborative effort of two 
or more agencies that provide resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of 
maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist 
activity."82 If Fusion Centers were open to allowing input from the private sector, information 
sharing for cybersecurity would be more efficient and beneficial to all areas of U.S. technology. 
However, proper flow of information will continue to be one of the more difficult solutions to 
implement.   
The establishment of a public-private partnership incorporating these recommendations will 
reinforce the cybersecurity capabilities of both the government and the private sector, while also 
potentially renewing the public’s trust in the government’s ability to respond to cyberattacks. 
The results of a Gallup poll conducted over a period of 10 years, from 2008 to 2018, ranged from 
a low of 14% and a high of only 28% in terms of the public’s confidence in the Federal 
Government’s ability to handle international and domestic issues.83 Potential disadvantages of 
using a public-private partnership for cybersecurity include a decrease in overall government 
accountability, a slower information sharing mechanism, and a lack of change in “need-to-know” 
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status and security clearance process.44 Despite this, there are ways to increase accountability 
from all parties by actively engaging both public and private partners as stakeholders in 
cybersecurity. Addressing these issues and utilizing the strengths of both the government and the 
private sector can help create a public-private partnership for cybersecurity that is beneficial for 
all U.S. institutions. 
Although the private sector needs more reinforcement for small businesses, the private sector is 
still an under-utilized cybersecurity resource for the government. With government intervention 
into the provision of cyber insurance for small business and the establishment of a public-private 
partnership for cybersecurity, the private sector and the government can be better positioned to 
address the evolution of cyber threats. Where a lack of a formal reporting structure or 
comprehensive response framework may be nonexistent, or where the government might be 
restricted, the private sector can potentially fill in the gaps for cyberattack response to ensure the 
protection of U.S. national security.   
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United States (U.S.) internet protocol (IP) space is dependent on critical infrastructure, and 
critical infrastructure is dependent on IP space. The all-encompassing realms, conflicting and 
overlapping jurisdictions, and competitive nature of cybersecurity create a contested space. 
Within this contested space exists adversaries with similar capabilities and advancements as the 
U.S. Throughout the 2017 National Security Strategy, the Trump Administration uses the term 
“competition” repeatedly in reference to other nations; this is the first time in the history of the 
National Security Strategy that the term has been used. This implies that the national leadership 
believes that any gaps in cybersecurity capabilities, whether in technology or knowledge, 
between the U.S. and its adversaries is closing and that the U.S. must compete for supremacy in 
the realm of cyberspace. Securing IP space is a matter of national security, which, depending on 
the target, severity, or perpetrator of the incident, could rise to the level of requiring the Federal 
Government to engage national defense capabilities. Given the nature of U.S. IP space, there 
arises the question as to whether or not DoD is restricted, or even over-restricted, from 
conducting national defense operations within U.S. IP space. 
Answering this question requires first determining what, if any, restrictions exist regarding 
Department of Defense (DoD) operations within U.S. IP space and defining what constitutes an 
“over-restriction.” The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the restrictions currently in place and 
provide an objective evaluation as to whether these restrictions are hindering DoD. For example, 
DoD is currently restricted in conducting law enforcement activities under Title 10 of the U.S. 
Code, the Posse Comitatus Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and 
therefore can only operate for means of national defense or in providing defense support of civil 
authorities (DSCA).1 Conversely, DoD may be over-restricted in terms of being unable to access 
sensitive information and to complete investigations and operations against insider threats and 
those who are U.S. citizens or operating in the U.S. DoD is restricted in accessing U.S. persons 
information (USPI) as well due to constitutionally-guaranteed rights found in the First and Fourth 
Amendments, and these restrictions will be examined to determine if they over-restrict DoD 





Personal Information – The Fourth Amendment 
A key consideration when discussing national security in the U.S. is the jurisdictional restrictions 
the government faces. One of the chief questions addressed here is whether the Federal 
Government, and specifically DoD, is currently restricted from effectively protecting the nation 
due to laws enacted with the intent to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens. While the efficacy of 
the restrictions in place will be discussed later in this chapter, the first objective is to identify and 
clarify what restrictions currently exist. 
The origination of these restrictions is the constitutionally-guaranteed right against unreasonable 
search and seizures, found in the Fourth Amendment and commonly interpreted as a right to 
privacy.2 The notion of a right to privacy has become deeply ingrained in the U.S. legal structure, 
ensuring that the property of an individual remains outside the jurisdiction of the government, 
unless the government has probable cause to investigate or seize that property. One issue that 
arises, which has not yet been decisively addressed, is the extent to which this provision can be 
applied in the ever-growing realm of IP space.  
This issue raises questions as to whether the government can access things like email, phone 
records, and other personal digital information without a warning, in the interest of national 
security, or if those things are protected under the Fourth Amendment.3 For privacy cases 
defended under Fourth Amendment protections, traditional jurisprudence has required that courts 
ask whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed.4 If an expectation of privacy did exist, 
the information would be protected under the Fourth Amendment and would therefore require a 
warrant. The questions that then arise regarding IP space is whether the traditional tests of 
privacy still apply, or if they are outdated when pertaining to digital information. 
When the government needs to access information that is critical to national security, is it able to 
do so effectively under current restrictions, or are those restrictions hindering the government 
from protecting the American public? Although the overall legal structure for addressing this 
issues is considered to be “patching and in critical ways outdated,”5 an effort can still be made to 
understand the most important laws currently in place and the areas of IP space in which they 
limit government access. Understanding what is currently in place will help construct a 
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theoretical framework for how the U.S. currently views privacy in the digital age, allowing firms 
to better understand how they can navigate that framework. 
What Information is at Stake? 
As cyberspace continues to advance and expand, so too does the amount of personal information 
that is available on digital platforms. Information that has historically been kept in purely 
physical form, such as written communication between individuals, is now conducted widely 
over the Internet. The storing of documentation on digital platforms, often containing sensitive 
information, has become commonplace. This paper will separate digital data into three 
categories: U.S. Person Information (USPI), Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and 
Digital Assets. 
U.S. Person Information (USPI) 
Information that is obtained through intelligence collection and analysis is governed by various 
regulations on how it can be gathered, depending on where it is obtained and to whom it belongs. 
If the information gathered is USPI, intelligence agencies will face additional prohibitions and 
restrictions on that information.6 A U.S. person is defined under the U.S. Code (U.S.C.) and 
through Executive Order (EO) as being “a citizen of the United States; an alien lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence; an unincorporated association with a substantial number of members 
who are citizens of the U.S. or are aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence; or a 
corporation that is incorporated in the U.S.”6 
Department of Defense Manual (DoDM) 5240.01 broadly describes the kind of information that 
is included as USPI as “reasonably likely to identify one or more specific U.S. persons:”  
“USPI may be either a single item of information or information that, when 
combined with other information, is reasonably likely to identify one or more 
specific U.S. persons. Determining whether information is reasonably likely to 
identify one or more specific U.S. persons in a particular context may require a 
case-by-case assessment by a trained intelligence professional. USPI is not 
limited to any single category of information or technology. Depending on the 
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context, examples of USPI may include: names or unique titles; government-
associated personal or corporate identification numbers; unique biometric records; 
financial information; and street address, telephone number, and Internet Protocol 
address information.”7 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) does not differ greatly from USPI in substance, but its 
definition makes it more widely applicable. While restrictions on USPI are primarily in the realm 
of intelligence gathering, PII can exist wherever interactions between government entities and 
individuals interact. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines PII as: 
“Any information that permits the identity of an individual to be directly or 
indirectly inferred, including any other information that is linked or linkable to 
that individual, regardless of whether the individual is a U.S. citizen, legal 
permanent resident, visitor to the U.S., or employee or contractor to the 
Department.”8 
Additionally, PII can be classified as “sensitive” information. This includes data, such as credit 
card account information, that if obtained by a malicious actor could lead to harm such as fraud 
or identify theft.9 DHS provide the following definition for such data: 
“Sensitive PII (SPII) is Personally Identifiable Information, which if lost, 
compromised, or disclosed without authorization, could result in substantial harm, 
embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual.”8 
It is important to note that both sensitive and non-sensitive PII are commonly collected by both 
private and government entities.10 This information is typically provided voluntarily by the 
individual when they sign a terms of agreement document or make a purchase from a website, or 
when they must provide it as a requirement for a new job.9 From a practical standpoint, this 
means that PII is pervasive across the entire digital spectrum, interacting with citizens over the 
course of daily activities when the make an online purchase, create an online account, or accept 




Digital data can also fall under the definition of digital assets, in accordance with the legal 
structures and definitions established under the Uniform Digital Assets Law (UDAL). Under this 
law, digital assets encompass all “electronic record in which an individual has a right or 
interest.”11 Communications in electronic form, documents that are kept on cloud-based systems 
or on hard drives, cryptocurrency, and even social media accounts are all included in this 
definition.11 The proliferation of digital assets has created hurdles in the ability of the 
government to protect individuals and their information without violating their right to privacy. 
Documents that might aid in a national security situation, even when they do not refer to any 
specific individual, might still fall within the definition of a digital asset. This type of 
information is further complicated by the emergence of cloud-based systems, which allows for 
large amounts of digital assets to be kept on Internet-based servers. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) identifies two unique issues regarding digital assets: 
“Executing law enforcement searches in a cloud-computing environment presents 
a twofold problem. First, little, if any, data pertaining to a computer user is found 
in a single geographic location. Second, and more important, even when the data 
is recovered, it may not be able to be converted to a format understandable by a 
human reader.”12 
The emergence, proliferation, and evolution of digital data technologies has forced privacy law 
to also evolve. To navigate the complexity this creates, the Federal Government has 
implemented laws and policies that have formed the current structure of privacy law. Although 
this structure is primarily built on congressional acts and Executive Branch policies, the court 
system has also developed extensive case law that has helped shape this system. 
Digital Information’s Impact on Policy 
The emergence, proliferation, and evolution of digital data technologies has led to the creation of 
new privacy law.13 The government has responded with laws and policies that have attempted to 
navigate these new digital complexities, ranging from legislation passed by Congress to rulings 
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handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court.14 One of the primary goals of this report is to 
summarize and discuss a few key laws and policies. 
How the U.S. Has Historically Handled Personal Information Data Collection 
Historically, the U.S. has handled the collection of data containing USPI more loosely when 
compared to contemporary data protection protocols. Personal data has not always been legally 
protected, and intelligence agencies have not always been as restricted and under the same 
amount of oversight for conducting surveillance on U.S. citizens as they are currently. In the 
1960s and 1970s, intelligence agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) surveilled domestic 
civil rights movements and anti-government protests and conducted covert action against foreign 
leaders and U.S. citizens, specifically through NSA wiretaps on Martin Luther King Jr.15 and 
other political activists as revealed through the Church and Pike Congressional Committees.16 In 
wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress investigated these intelligence agencies for evidence of 
potential intelligence abuse, finding that these agencies had conducted unlawful tactics for 
intelligence gathering, including illegal wiretaps, secret bugging, and harassment of U.S. 
citizens. These findings were used as the basis for establishing legislative oversight of the 
intelligence community (IC), to demand more accountability, through the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(HPSCI).16 The findings were also instrumental in the creation of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978.17  
There are specific policies currently in place that provide the government with specific and 
restricted authority to conduct intelligence operations on U.S. citizens and to collect data that 
includes USPI,6 such as EO 12333 and FISA. These policies also apply to IP space, and it is the 
overwhelming presence of U.S. citizens activities within IP space that complicates federal 
defensive and intelligence-gathering activities, particularly for DoD and especially when USPI is 
involved. The rules under which DoD operates within IP space were originally established based 
on historical signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection and included the principles of Computer 
Network Operations (CNO), Computer Network Defense (CND), and Cyber Network Attacks 
(CNA), terms the U.S. military used to describe its activities in IP space.18  
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CNE is a broad military concept that allows the military to use computer networks to “gain 
strategic advantage” in the military paradigm.19 This acknowledges that knowledge is power, and 
indicates that increasing the amount of information that can be collected regarding a potential 
adversary will better allow the military to make strategic decisions. CNE enables civilian and 
military organizations to protect, defend, and retaliate against malicious computer operations 
from enemy networks.20  
CND is a set of processes and defense measures used to protect computer networks against 
infiltrations resulting in denial of service and server disruption. This term describes the actions 
taken within DoD to “protect, monitor analyze, detect and respond to an authorized activity 
within DoD information systems and computer networks.”21 A CND utilizes and allows for 
computer networks to execute offensive operations against enemy computers and networks.22  
DoD defines a CNA as “the actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, 
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers 
and networks themselves.23 These three terms (CNE, CND, and CNA) frame the discussion and 
form the terminology by which DoD operates within IP space, and define the activities in which 
they are authorized to engage. This baseline knowledge of DoD operations and the legality of 
operating within IP space is essential in determining if DoD is restricted in operating within U.S. 
IP space.  
Policies by Which the Federal Government Must Abide 
A full analysis of the means by which DoD is restricted in acting within U.S. IP space requires 
examining the following laws, policies, and acts: 
● Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution  
● Department of Defense Manual 5240.01 
● Executive Order 12333 
● Title 10 of the U.S. Code 
● Title 18 of the U.S. Code 
● Title 32 of the U.S. Code 
● Title 50 of the U.S. Code 
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● Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
● Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, 
Dragnet-collection, and Online Monitoring Act (USA Freedom Act) 
● Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
● Privacy Act of 1974 
The U.S. Constitution establishes the fundamental rights and civil liberties of U.S. citizens, on 
which Congress has based legislated restrictions on the authority and ability of the Federal 
Government, in particularly DoD, to protect these rights and liberties. As discussed previously in 
this chapter, the Fourth Amendment establishes “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures…”2 This right 
has been interpreted by American citizens to apply to U.S. persons within IP space as well, 
protecting their digital persons and effects against unlawful search and seizure through 
interpretation that electronic surveillance is a form of search covered by the Fourth 
Amendment.23 Through the interpretation of case law, such as Katz v. United States and Smith v. 
Maryland, discussed later in this chapter, there is a reasonable expectation to privacy regarding 
communication methods that is constantly challenged. 
Department of Defense Manual 5240.01 
Department of Defense Manual (DoDM) 5240.01, issued in 2016, “establishes procedures to 
enable DoD to conduct authorized intelligence activities in a manner that protects the 
constitutional and legal rights and the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons.”24 The manual 
provides internal guidance and establishes internal procedures by which DoD Intelligence 
Components are to outline the collection, retention, and dissemination of USPI as well as the 
appropriate methods for electronic surveillance, concealed monitoring, physical searches, the 
searching of mail and use of mail covers, physical surveillance, and undisclosed participation in 
organizations. To intentionally collect USPI, a DoD Intelligence Component must first confirm 
that the information to be collected is reasonably believed to assist the mission given to them and 




1. Publicly available 
2. Consent 
3. Foreign intelligence 
4. Counterintelligence 
5. Threats to safety 
6. Protection of intelligence sources, methods, and activities 
7. Current, former, or potential sources of assistance to intelligence activities 
8. Persons in contact with sources or potential sources 
9. Personnel security 
10. Physical security 
11. Communications security investigation 
12. Overhead and airborne reconnaissance 
13. Administrative purposes 
Retention of USPI in DoD networks depends on whether the information was intentionally or 
incidentally collected, if it was voluntarily provided, if there were any mitigating special 
circumstances, or if the information requires extended retention.24 Further, dissemination of 
USPI collected or retained by a DoD Intelligence Component is allowed only if specific 
conditions are met. The authority to conduct electronic surveillance is dependent on the mission, 
the status and location of the U.S. person, the methods used to conduct the surveillance, and the 
specific type of communication sought, and must also comply with the Fourth Amendment.24 A 
DoD Intelligence component may conduct surveillance targeting a person in the U.S. only for 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.24 The complexity of the procedures in place 
is apparent. These authorizations and limitations, established in DoDM 5240.01, form the basis 
for internal oversight of intelligence activities, which will be further discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Executive Order 12333 
Another source that helps define the authority of the U.S. government regarding data collection 
is EO 12333. Issued in 1981, EO 12333 is one of the primary documents that permits intelligence 
agencies to conduct surveillance activities, as well as collect, retain, and disseminate information 
 101 
 
gathered under those activities. Specifically, the NSA uses EO 12333 to establish its legal 
authorization for un-encrypting information and collection of USPI.25  In accordance with 
priorities set by the president, EO 12333 allows for the “…collection of information concerning, 
and conduct activities to protect against, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), intelligence activities directed against the U.S., international criminal drug 
activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, 
organizations, persons, and their agents.”26  
United States Code 
The appropriate framework for DoD by which DoD coordinates with other government entities 
to respond to acts of war will also depend on the different title classifications under which they 
fall. Title 10, Title 18, Title 32, and Title 50 all provide legal classifications for military or law 
enforcement agencies to fulfill specific duties and functions. 
The U.S. Code (U.S.C.) provides the legal authority by which military and law enforcement 
agencies are governed during times of war and peace. The Title that authorizes a specific 
department’s functions under will change depending on the functions that department will 
perform, so a single department could fall under any of a number of separate Titles depending on 
the specific situation.  
Title 10 of the U.S. Code 
Title 10 of the U.S.C. outlines the basic role of the armed forces. It provides the legal basis for 
their respective missions and organizations, the constitutional basis of which is derived from 
Articles 1 and 2. Title 10 governs active duty forces and is used to conduct military activities and 
articulate the basis for military operations where the primary mission is national defense. 
Oversight of Title 10 lies with the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Active duty 
forces governed by Title 10 are paid with federal dollars and their orders originate from the 
President and are then executed through the Combatant Commands. Title 10, Section 111 states 
that it will “man, train and equip U.S. forces for military operations in cyberspace.”27 Therefore, 
military operations in cyberspace are an authorized activity for Title 10 forces.  
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Title 32 of the U.S. Code 
Title 32 of the U.S.C. and how it classifies the National Guard is a bit more complex when 
compared to other National Guard statuses: state active duty, active duty, or the 
mobilization/federalization. Under the command and control of the state governor, but paid by 
the Federal Government, forces authorized under Title 32 are utilized in response to natural 
disasters, large domestic attacks (e.g. 9/11 or the Oklahoma City bombing), training, and other 
Federally-authorized activities. If the National Guard operates under Title 32, they are not 
affected by the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act, a Federal statute that prohibits the 
government’s ability to use the military as a police force,1 in any way, unless they operate under 
Title 10 authority. Operation Noble Eagle, the Federal Government’s initial response to 9/11, is a 
primary example of a Title 32 action: It began with the mobilization of thousands of National 
Guardsmen to perform security detail for military installations, airports, and other potential 
targets. The mobilized units also provided defense and security around the White House, the 
Pentagon, the Capitol Building, and other government structures deemed as “high risk” for 
further attack.28 
Figure 3-1 outlines the differences between Title 10 authorization for the active duty of the 
armed forces and Title 32 National Guard civil authority. When the National Guard for an 
individual state operates under state active duty status, the state governor commands their 
activities and the state pays for operations. National Guards can also operate under Title 32 
authorization. In this case, the governor retains command of the National Guard but the Federal 
Government pays. For example, under Title 32 authorization, National Guard units can train for 
future overseas deployments and conduct disaster response operations. Again, these activities 
would be conducted under state authority but would be funded using Federal funds. Another 
example of National Guard operations under Title 32 authorization is their deployment along the 
U.S.-Mexico border in support of Customs and Border Control. 
Title 10 controls Federal active duty forces, which can include the Reserves. The National 
Guard, when federalized, also falls under Title 10 authorization with the President serving as the 
Commander in Chief. The Federal Government would also financially support this activity. 
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Figure 3-1 Title 10 and Title 32 Authorizations 
 
Title 50 of the U.S. Code 
Title 50 of the U.S.C, entitled “War and National Defense in the United States,” comprises the 
National Security Act of 1947 and outlines the U.S. national defense and security agencies and 
organizations as well as restructuring defense and intelligence agencies. When acting under Title 
50 authorization, defense and intelligence agencies are only obligated to comply only with the 
U.S. Constitution and domestic statutes; they are not obligated to comply with international 
law.29 The 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound that resulted in his death is an example of 
a direct execution of Title 50: the Joint Operations Command planned and directed Seal Team 6 
to operate under Title 50 authorities due to the classification and direct authority of the 
operation.30 Most intelligence agencies operate under Title 50 authority, while the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and NSA specifically operate under both Title 10 and Title 50 
authorities. Under Title 50, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) possesses the overarching 
authority and directs U.S. government operations against unconventional threats, including cyber 
threats. Section 3093 of Title 50 also directly addresses U.S. IP space by authorizing agencies 
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and departments to “Secure U.S. interests by conducting military and foreign intelligence 
operations in cyberspace.”27  
Title 18 of the U.S. Code 
When examining military operations in U.S. IP space, including collecting USPI, it is important 
to also consider law enforcement authorizations and procedures. Title 18 of the U.S.C. contains 
the statues for domestic law enforcement agencies and defines the different crimes and 
corresponding criminal procedures. The statutes that are directly applicable to the scope of this 
research are Section 1385, which establishes authorization for the use of Army and Air Force 
personnel under Posse Comitatus, and Section 3052, which authorizes the FBI and their special 
agents and officials to make arrests, carry firearms, and serve warrants.  
Table 3-1 outlines the various Titles of the U.S.C. discussed above and their corresponding 
authorization for military and law enforcement and intelligence agencies, their command and 





 Title 10 Title 18 
Name 
Active Forces,  
Armed Forces,  
Department of Defense 
Posse Comitatus,  
Law enforcement.  
Federal Government not state (DPS) describes 
criminal statutes/etc. 
Command and Control President 
Depends on the department, secretary, or level of 
government the Title 18 force is under 
Oversight 
Senate Armed Services Committee,  
House Armed Services Committee 
President and the Cabinet secretary have direct 
oversight, and the President has oversight over 
Cabinet secretaries.  
If it is an agency, it reports through the Executive 
Branch.  
Congress always has oversight over laws, but no 
operational control here 
Mission Types National defense 
Wiretaps for law enforcement. Authorizes FBI. 
Ends use of Federal troops in law enforcement. 
Law enforcement war on drugs.  
Prohibits law enforcement by military.  
Emergency situation of WMD 
Funding Source Federal 
Local law enforcement by state sale and income 
tax, funding authorized by Congress of major 
departments as well 
Restrictions 
Posse Comitatus, limited domestic law 
enforcement operations.  
Must abide by international law compliance 
FISA restrictions 










 Title 32 Title 50 
Name National Guard 
War and National Defense,  
National Security Act of 1947 




Senate Armed Services Committee,  
House Armed Services Committee 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
 House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence 
Mission Types 
In service of the Federal Government: hazards, 
disasters, and emergencies 
Covert action,  
Intelligence communities, 
 bin Laden raid,  
doesn’t acknowledge publicly and isn’t traditional 
military activities 
Funding Source Federal 
ODNI reviews the budgets of the IC and distributes 
from there 
Restrictions 
Federalization event of NSSE no problem with 
Posse Comitatus,  
International law compliance 
Doesn’t have to comply with international law, but 
civil rights of American citizens must be 
considered. 




Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978) 
FISA, enacted in 1978 by Congress, is another document that limits the extent to which U.S. 
intelligence agencies can monitor the communications, including digital, of U.S. citizens. The act 
establishes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court which permits the use of wiretaps and 
monitoring of foreign agents and adversaries within the U.S. In 2008, Congress added the 
controversial Section 702 to the act, which allows warrantless monitoring of communications by 
foreigners in the U.S. and abroad,31,32 which in turn picks up communications of Americans who 
are communicating with those foreign agents. This becomes controversial when U.S. citizens’ 
information gets swept up with the intelligence collection. 
FISA protects U.S. citizens against espionage, sabotage, and attacks by monitoring individuals 
suspected of such activities. Section 702 allows intelligence agencies to collect foreign 
intelligence from non-U.S. citizens located outside the U.S. Because of this provision, it is 
believed that large scale collection of communications of U.S. citizens has incidentally 
occurred.33,32 
The USA Freedom Act (2015) 
The USA Freedom Act imposes limits on the bulk collection of metadata of U.S citizens by 
intelligence agencies.34,35 The act was passed in 2015 in response to the Edward Snowden 
information leak that exposed questionable programs run by the NSA to collect USPI.36 This act 
ends bulk collection of all records authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act.37 In response 
to the provisions of the USA Freedom Act, tech companies became more aware of their legal 
responsibility to protect user data they collect and their relationship with the government. When 
it comes to understanding the restrictions placed on the Federal Government, the inability to 
collect bulk data is an important aspect to be remembered. 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 is used to address digital privacy and cybersecurity 
by identifying as a federal crime the unauthorized accessing or hacking a protected computer 
without acceptable warrants and permission.38 After being amended in 1994 to more broadly 
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include protections of the private sector, private companies began citing this act to protect their 
trade secrets and economic information and sensitive/protected research.39 The provisions of the 
act were originally designed to protect the information systems and databases of the U.S. 
government; following 9/11, the Patriot Act expanded the scope of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act to better adapt to emerging threats by expanding the scope of computer crime.38 The 
complexities of this act play an important role in cybersecurity, laying a foundation for 
jurisdiction between the Federal Government and private sector entities when it comes to hacks. 
The Privacy Act  
The Privacy Act of 1974 established a code of fair information practices by governing the 
collection and dissemination of U.S. citizens’ information that is maintained by Federal agencies, 
including tax returns and PII.34,40 The Privacy Act places restrictions on the accessing of U.S. 
citizens’ information and requires that certain procedures be followed whenever this information 
is. This is important in the framework of government restrictions as it places severe yet important 
safeguards around individual’s information. The purpose is to balance national security concerns 
with personal safeguards and privacy, and to maintain transparency regarding the information the 
Federal Government has on its citizens. 
Case Law 
To fully understand the current U.S. policies surrounding the security of personal information, 
the relevant case law must be evaluated. When discussing case law, it must be viewed from the 
perspective of: 1) What the court has said regarding previous, specific situations where Fourth 
Amendment protections were challenged; and 2) The impact these cases may have on future 
policy. Viewing case law through this lens can provide a picture of how policy must be formed 
to fit within the precedent set by those cases can begin to form. This report will examine case 
law in two sections to better form a basic understanding for potential future policy. The first 
section will briefly discuss some key aspects of privacy law from the judicial perspective and 
how some cases have shifted that law. The second section will break down four cases that the 
authors of this report have chosen as examples of how the court has previously responded to 
specific issues regarding Fourth Amendment protections. Again, each of these sections will be 
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viewed through the lens of the impact on potential future policy, particularly how the court might 
resolve constitutional challenges and ambiguities contained within future laws. While this 
summary of case law is not meant to be exhaustive, the examples discussed herein can help to 
understand the impact the court system has had on privacy law. 
Brief History of Key Decisions 
Many cases decided during the 20th century regarding privacy focused on physical items and 
provided the foundation for what is now referred to as colloquially as “privacy law,” which has 
been more recently expanded to include digital aspects. Although the discussion of non-digital 
aspects of privacy law are not within the scope of this report, a brief summary of how the courts 
have historically interpreted privacy law is important. 
Challenges to what falls within the purview of the Fourth Amendment have been pervasive, 
ranging from the famous Weeks v. United States case of 1914 to the more recent ruling in Safford 
Unified School District v. Redding in 2009,41 and many more in between. One of the biggest 
debates that has arisen through these cases has been deciding what falls within the limits of 
requiring a warrant, based upon probable cause, before being searched or seized. As a response 
to this debate, the two-pronged test was created, as discussed further in the Katz case below. 
When an individual’s privacy in a certain place, action, or item was questioned, that situation 
would be covered under Fourth Amendment protections if both the individual and society 
(emphasis added) believed that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in that situation.42,43 
This two-pronged approach was created in the ruling of Katz v. United States (1967), where the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that both individuals and society at large expect a reasonable amount 
of privacy when entering a phone booth.42 An additional example of the discussion surrounding 
this test is United States v. White (1971), in which the Supreme Court ruled in that when a person 
invites someone else into their home, the homeowner gives up any reasonable expectation of 
privacy for what is said in the presence of the other person.42 The White ruling has since formed 
the legal foundation for allowing an informant to wear a recording device to gather information 
that admissible in court. Lastly, two important cases, United States v. Miller (1939) and Smith v. 
Maryland (1979), were both used to establish the precedent that once an individual grants access 
 110 
 
to someone else regarding their sensitive information, such as bank records, address, or phone 
number, that individual no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy for that information.42 
More recent cases dealing with emerging technologies have been forced to consider both new 
and old interpretations regarding privacy. Some of these cases are based on the precedents set 
above, while others have established new precedents. While there are many cases related to this 
issue that could be discussed, the following cases were specifically included in this discussion 
due to their strong importance and direct relevance to the development of digital privacy. The 
importance and relevance of the cases will be further discussed later in this report. 
Carpenter v. United States (2018) 
One of the most recent decisions that directly contributes to the discussion of digital privacy was 
handed down by the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States. In this case, the Court ruled 
that an individual’s location data, collected by a cellular company, could not be obtained by the 
Federal Government without a warrant.44 This case is crucial to the development of privacy laws 
in the digital age as it applied Fourth Amendment protections to digital information held by a 
third party, in this case, the cellular company.44 This case established a precedent for restricting 
the government in gathering information from third-party cellular companies. The majority 
opinion of the Court prescribed that the location information of an individual belongs to the 
individual at all times, therefore falling directly within the limits of the Fourth Amendment.45 
 In the future, this could potentially extend to other third-party entities like Facebook, Twitter, 
online forums, and email servers.  However, it is possible that the Court may rule differently in 
the future as Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch each individually dissented on this 
case. The essence of their various dissents was that the data was voluntarily given up by the 
individual to the cellular company, therefore making the company, not the individual, the owner 
of the data.46 These two varying viewpoints will have a critical impact on how the government 





United States v. Ackerman (2018) 
Similar to the Carpenter case mentioned above, United States v. Ackerman also involved data 
from a third party, but this case took a slightly different direction. In the case of Ackerman, the 
email provider AOL discovered, through its internal filtering systems, that the plaintiff had sent 
incriminating evidence through the email system. AOL flagged this content and sent this 
information through an intermediary to law enforcement. The individual argued that his emails 
were protected under the Fourth Amendment and therefore the government should not have been 
able to access them without a search warrant, even though they were voluntarily given to the 
government. The government argued that the plaintiff violated AOL’s terms of agreement by 
sending illegal content over their servers, and therefore had no expectation for privacy of his 
emails. The Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff.46 
Through this decision, a precedent was set that could allow for private companies to use their 
terms of agreement as protection against criminal activity and threats to national security. In the 
event that a private company discovers that their digital platform is being used for criminal 
activity, the ruling in Ackerman helped establish the possibility for them to begin providing that 
information to law enforcement, which will remain admissible in court. 
Riley v. California (2014) 
This case was critical for digital privacy as it confirmed a precedent set in a previous case, 
United States v. Jones (2012), which found that installing and using a global positioning system 
(GPS) to track a citizen constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. In Riley, the Supreme 
Court found that law enforcement could not search an individual’s phone without a warrant after 
an arrest.43 Since this was the first case in which the Court specifically addressed electronic 
devices, the ruling helped establish that digital information on a phone is protected under the 
Fourth Amendment.43 Since previous case law had established that items on a person could be 
searched after an arrest, this was a major step forward in defining the boundaries of digital 
privacy. The Riley case did this by clarifying that due to the large amount of information 




United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) 
This case is the oldest of those included in this report and does not directly deal with digital, but 
its importance on the overall discussion surrounding digital data and privacy cannot be 
understated. In the Verdugo-Urquidez ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that Fourth Amendment 
protections only apply to non-citizen individuals with strong voluntary connection to the U.S.3 
This means that searches and seizures of foreign individuals do not require a warrant. The 
precedent set by this ruling has massive potential implications for digital information. Since IP 
space is increasingly creating a “global” connection, with communications and more from 
foreign individuals intersecting with those of U.S. citizens, the issue can be raised as to whether 
Fourth Amendment protections apply to communication that occurs between a U.S. citizen and a 
non-U.S. citizen.3 This case has established a precedent, which can potentially be used in cyber 
situations on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether the individual in question, usually a non-
citizen, has a strong connection to the U.S. That answer can be used to decide whether Fourth 
Amendment protections apply. 
Other Cases with Future Policy Implications 
The cases described above provide good examples of why case law must be taken into 
consideration when discussing the issue of privacy and digital information. However, these are 
not the only cases that could be discussed. The following cases also each deal with the issue of 
privacy in some way, and form a good primer on case law for privacy and Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
 Safford Unified School District v. Redding, 557 U.S. (2009) 
 Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) 
 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) 
 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) 
 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) 




Summary of Judicial Influence on Privacy Law 
Generally speaking, many of the same Fourth Amendment protections that have existed for 
physical items have been transferred to the new digital world when it comes to personal property 
and the expectation of privacy. The two-pronged test for reasonable expectation of privacy is still 
used, although digital situations have yet to face this test. Many of these parameters are still 
being discovered and defined. The courts will likely have a busy few decades ahead of them, 
which means that close attention will need to be paid by anyone connected with the cyber world. 
Each new ruling that is handed down will shape the overall legal infrastructure, which could last 
for decades before seeing substantial change. The cases listed above are not exhaustive, but were 
included to illustrate the type of decisions that are being made. As it stands, there are few pieces 
of information in the digital realm that remain completely immune to possible search and 
seizure. Under the reasoning in the cases above, the Federal Government can access nearly all 
information available in the IP space, so long as the proper methods of obtaining a warrant are 
followed. 
Findings - Is DoD Over Restricted? 
The difficulty in the U.S. government’s ability to operate in U.S. IP space for national defense is 
the prevalent activity and presence, as well as the vast amount of personal information, of U.S. 
citizens within IP space. This is not a flaw of the system, but rather an inherent characteristic. 
There are specific Federal Government policies in which DoD, DHS, DOJ, law enforcement, and 
state and local government laws must abide by. What exactly does this look like though, when it 
comes to real world actions by these Federal entities? How are the above policies, which 
delineate where and how intelligence agencies can operation, practically followed? 
It should be noted that while there are many internal policies and manuals that direct the activity 
of each Federal agency, this report will only examine the major laws, policies, statutes, and case 
law discussed previously in this chapter and describe how each contributes to the restriction of 
DoD operations within IP space. This section will consider the complexity of the interworking 
nature of the major laws governing this industry and summarize the combined impact on DoD. 
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First, there are tangible ways in which DoD is restricted when operating within U.S. IP space 
while assisting DHS in protecting critical infrastructure. If DoD attempts to assist DHS while 
operating under Title 10 authority, it is restricted from collecting information on U.S. citizens 
and therefore is restricted from collecting any data, as it may inadvertently collect information on 
U.S. citizens in the process. In order to support civil authorities, including in law enforcement or 
in a defensive capacity, they must be authorized. Though potentially troublesome, this scenario 
provides the potential to institute a protocol for interagency cooperation to allow both agencies to 
access and use the information. The National Guard has some form of cybersecurity capabilities 
and expectations in all 50 states. 
The issue then arises as to the restrictions specifically concerning U.S. Cyber Command 
operations in U.S. IP space, which will depend on what operations are being conducted and the 
location in which they are conducted. If U.S. Cyber Command is conducting operations under 
Title 10 authorization, and these operations extend beyond the “boundaries” of U.S. IP space, the 
operations would fall under the jurisdiction of international law, including the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), and would require compliance with other international legal 
obligations in cyberspace. If operations are conducted under Title 50 authority, however, there is 
no legal responsibility to comply with international law; they must only comply with the U.S. 
Constitution. Title 50 authorization is frequently for covert action, exemplified by the raid on 
Osama bin Laden’s compound.  
The restrictions on DoD operations in cyberspace are specific under Title 10 authorization but 
under Title 50 authorization there is a wider scope of authorizations and operational activities 
with different oversight. U.S. Cyber Command and NSA are each authorized under both Titles, 
so they have authorities and breadth of both. These restrictions can be avoided and passed around 
if components of the IC work hand in hand with the FBI or local law enforcement in fusion 
centers or intelligence sharing spaces, so the tradeoff of information and authorization would 
flow smoothly.  
Policies cannot keep up with the current speed of technological innovations. Policies have 
bureaucratic red tape, requiring time to pass each one of them. The rules and regulations that 
establish restrictions on DoD regarding acquiring and collecting USPI will change depending on 
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the citizenship classification of the person. For example, a foreign individual who has a U.S. 
physical address is classified as a U.S. person, and therefore the collection of that individual’s 
USPI is not legal unless the DoD abides by the requisite rules and regulations. Within 
cyberspace, an individual located outside the U.S. can fake an IP address as being located within 
the U.S. DoD cannot analyze USPI without a specific mission that requires this analysis and a 
procedure or category which allows for the analysis to occur. This makes the current policy 
framework strict, but not over-restrictive. There are policies in place to protect the privacy and 
civil liberties of U.S. citizens but these policies are not over-restrictive. What could be 
considered potentially over-restrictive of DoD operations in cyberspace is the bureaucratic 
process of the Federal Government. However, this discussion is outside the scope of this 
research.  
Understanding the Complexity of Future Action 
The Security vs. Privacy Debate 
Determining whether the Federal Government is over-restricted in U.S. IP space requires an 
understanding of the underlying debate that causes those restrictions and the complexities that 
debate creates. The core of the debate centers on differing opinions as to what is most important: 
privacy for individuals or the security of the nation. The difficulty in shaping relevant policy 
around this issue is that this opinion can and often does shift with time. Moreover, different 
groups of individuals often have competing goals. Figure 3-2 presents two sets of polling data 
from the Pew Research Center.47 The poll results show that U.S. citizens think the government 
has not gone far enough to protect the country from terrorist threats, while simultaneously 
believing that the government should not monitor communications of U.S. citizens. The 
electorate does not believe that the government has done enough to protect the country, but they 
also do not want to cede more power to the government to monitor individual communications, 
even when necessary to protect the government. This contradictory nature of the electorate can 
make it difficult to find a balance when creating policy on privacy. 
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Figure 3-2 Weighing Security Against Privacy47 
 
When framed in the perspective of anti-terrorism policies, data collected by the Pew Research 
Center between 2014 and 2015 revealed that a majority of the individuals polled believe that 
current U.S. policy has not adequately protected the country from terrorism, with a slight 
exception in 2013.47 Other data sets collected have indicated that most Americans believe it is 
unacceptable to monitor communications from U.S. citizens.48 These results are presented in 
Figure 3-3. It should be noted that these results show that public opinion on monitoring changes 
greatly depending on the target population group.  
This privacy challenge does not only apply to concerns over active surveillance. Recent polling 
data has shown that users of mobile devices are hesitant to access government services on their 
mobile devices out of fear that the government will begin collecting their data.49 This would 
imply that ease of access is not always worth the perceived cost to privacy for many people when 














The desire for individual privacy must be balanced against the Federal Government’s ability to 
fulfill its primary role and responsibility of ensuring the safety of the nation and its citizens. As 
IP space continues to advance and expand, so too does the complexity of ensuring that the 
government has the adequate tools necessary to combat emerging cyber threats. According to the 
Congressional Research Service, 
“Because modern-day criminals are constantly developing new tools and 
techniques to facilitate their illicit activities, law enforcement is challenged with 
leveraging its tools and authorities to keep pace. For instance, interconnectivity 
and technological innovation have not only fostered international business and 
communication, they have also helped criminals carry out their operations. At 
times, these same technological advances have presented unique hurdles for law 
enforcement and officials charged with combating malicious actors.”50 
Examples of these technological developments have been discussed previously. One of the more 
well-known examples was the subject of a recent controversy between the government and 
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Apple, when encrypted iPhones could not be accessed by officials investigating the terrorist 
attack in San Bernardino, California.51 There are many ideas that have been proposed as a means 
to address these new challenges, some of which are far-reaching in their effect (proposals to ban 
outright any encryption of data that does not allow access to law enforcement being one far-
reaching example).50 Seeking a balance between maintaining privacy and security creates a 
difficult policy dilemma. Understanding that this dilemma exists, and the parameters that have so 
far been set, is the first step in evaluating possible recommendations. 
Federal Actions to Accommodate this Debate 
In the wake of the Edward Snowden leak in 2013, through which details of the NSA’s collection 
of U.S. citizens’ data was exposed, the issue of privacy has been frequently addressed in political 
discussions.47 Although the evidence released by Snowden caused Americans to view 
government surveillance more disapprovingly,48 the government has not remained silent on the 
topic. Strategies such as the 2018 DHS Cyber Security Strategy (DHS CS) have recognized that 
the issue of privacy is important: 
“DHS must uphold privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in accordance with 
applicable law and policy. The Department empowers our cybersecurity programs 
to succeed by integrating privacy protections from the outset and employing a 
layered approach to privacy and civil liberties oversight.”52 
The creation and use of “Chief Privacy Officers,” along with the implementation of standards 
tasked to those officers,53 are examples of how the Federal Government is trying to uphold 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in accordance with applicable law and policy. These Chief 
Privacy Officers, typically executive-level managers in the private sector or upper-level 
employees within the government, are responsible for creating policies that protect the private 
data of both employees and customers.54 Although there is no single, comprehensive law 
governing data collection and privacy, many sector-specific pieces of legislation, such as HIPAA 
(see discussion in Chapter 2), have been passed into law.55 Whenever DoD collects PII of a 
citizen, it currently publishes a “system of record” to the Federal Register.56 Even the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) has entered the discussion of privacy and security, issuing a 
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directive that “…requires Federal agencies to take specific steps to protect individual privacy 
whenever they use third-party websites and applications to engage with the public.”57 
These situations illustrate that the Federal Government has taken direct action to address 
concerns over privacy while balancing the desires of the public regarding security. The question 
that then arises is whether Federal agencies, specifically DoD, have been over-restricted by these 
measures. As discussed previously in this chapter, the research indicates that the answer is no: 
Although there are restrictions in place, which are inherent to our constitutionally-guaranteed 
form of government, the research does not indicate that DoD is over-restricted. However, there 
are changes to the current system that can be implemented to better secure the digital world. 
Chief among these potential changes is an area that is in need of research, which is the 
involvement of the private sector in advanced methods of cybersecurity, often in ways in which 
the Federal Government cannot due to jurisdictional boundaries. 
The Untouchable Void 
Even if the final recommendations outlined at the end of this report are considered and 
implemented, the Federal Government is still faced with the problem of constraints on their 
jurisdiction that will never go away. This “untouchable void” is the jurisdictional boundary that 
the government cannot cross. It most often manifests itself as the private sector, i.e. as the private 
sector organizations and the customers with whom they interact, as well as private citizens’ 
interactions within IP space. The jurisdiction of government does not extend into households for 
daily protection; similarly, neither does it extend into the realms of the private sector. Individuals 
and the private sector organizations are responsible for their own individual defense against 
cyber threats, just as they are responsible for their individual defense against physical threats. 
Further, if an attack occurs against a private sector organization, that organization is responsible 
for the mechanism with which to respond to that threat, as well as the mitigation of damage that 
occurs afterward. 
There is potential for a cooperative partnership to exist between the public and private sectors, 
but that partnership can only expand the government’s jurisdiction to a small degree. The 
individuals and firms will ultimately still be primarily responsible for a large part of the cyber 
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interaction that occurs today. When a malicious actor attempts to hack a private sector 
organization, it is the organization that will be responsible and have the best incentive to prevent 
the hack from occurring. If the hack is successful, it is the organization that will most 
significantly feel the effects and will be left to coordinate the response. Policy decisions must 
then consider how to fill this void what changes are required to permit the private sector to better 
manage cybersecurity on its own. Publicly available and open-source research in this area is 
lacking, but a quick conversation on the possible advantages of the improved system should be 
discussed.  
Can Private Contractors Fill the Void? 
Based on the research conducted, the recommended method for filling this void is by 
encouraging the private sector to perform actions that the government cannot, as exemplified in 
the Carpenter case discussed previously in which the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal 
Government must obtain a warrant to access an individual’s cellular location data. The private 
sector can collect the same data without a warrant, if the individual agrees of their own volition 
to relinquish that data. This voluntary relinquishing of a constitutional right to privacy is a 
unique and powerful tool possessed by the private sector that the government does not possess. 
While the government will always be responsible for national security, there are many situations 
in cybersecurity that do not amount to a national security concern. An attack against a private 
sector organization does not necessitate government involvement, but it does require a clear 
framework that allows private sector organizations to respond to these attacks. 
Cybersecurity, from a historical perspective, has found increasing use of private sector 
organizations only recently. One high-profile example of which is the 2016 hack against the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC). In response, the DNC turned to a private company to 
identify and track the hackers, which the company accomplished in just a single day.58 As one 
intelligence expert explained: 
“By stepping aside to let private firms expose nation-state hackers, the U.S. 
government preserves its intelligence capabilities and options to retaliate. It’s an 
informal arrangement that has been good for business and government and bad for 
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state-sponsored hackers… American government agencies are often loathe to 
speak publicly about the origin of cyber-attacks because they fear exposing their 
methods of monitoring nation-state hackers. Officials commenting publicly can 
also undercut efforts to pursue prosecution, apply diplomatic pressure, or retaliate 
in other ways. So the US government has been perfectly happy to let private 
companies take the lead while they formulate a response.”58 
Private sector organizations are in the unique position of being able to identify hackers and 
publicly release their identity, without risking political ramifications. This disincentive to 
hacking is a tool that public entities often cannot use, for risk of political retribution. An 
intelligence expert describes it this way: 
“Successful attribution makes hackers’ jobs harder. As the risk of getting caught 
goes up, the likelihood of a country conducting an attack to obtain illicit 
information declines. When cybersecurity firms are able to call-out nation states 
for engaging in data theft, destruction, and espionage, hackers and the countries 
that employ them must consider real costs in the form of public embarrassment 
and potential retribution.”58 
ODNI designates attribution, or the “identification of the actor responsible for a [cyberattack]…” 
as “...a critical step in formulating a national response to such attacks.”59 Private sector 
organizations can respond quicker than government systems that can get caught up in procedural 
requirements. Further, computer forensics capabilities of the private sector are developing 
quickly and might even become more sophisticated than U.S. intelligence agencies.61 However, 
this does not come without risks. Private firms do have large incentives to succeed in this area, as 
demand for their services will increase with more media attention and successful attribution of 
future cyberattacks.60 
Another vital cybersecurity tool which the private sector has, but the government does not, is the 
ability to require individuals to voluntarily surrender their data and privacy through terms of 
agreement documentation, as discussed in the Ackerman and Carpenter cases. While the 
government cannot invade an individual’s privacy without a warrant, individuals can relinquish 
 122 
 
that privacy to a private sector organization through signing a terms and agreement document. 
This document can contain clauses that allows the private sector organization to collect and keep 
PII, and it can even contain clauses that require the individual to waive their right to sue the 
organization in court. The government cannot force an individual to relinquish a constitutional 
right, but it can be relinquished of the individual’s own volition. 
The discussion above illustrates that there are multiple methods by which the private sector can 
utilize the information that they gather through terms of agreement documents and other 
voluntary contracts. It should be noted that although the private sector possesses the tools 
described above, private sector organizations working for the government often face the same or 
similar restrictions as government entities, meaning they do not possess these tools. Regardless, 
if even a small portion of the private sector is able to become self-sufficient regarding 
cybersecurity, it will be to the benefit of the government. Government resources are limited, and 
the less it is required to assist or aide the private in minor cyber-related matters, the more it can 
focus these resources on issues of national security. Because of this, the authors of this report 
argue that increasing the self-sufficiency of the private sector regarding cybersecurity will 
require less strain on government resources. 
There is a more important aspect to this discussion though, which is the mechanism for 
cooperation between private and public entities. As the Ackerman case shows, it is possible for 
these private contractors to serve as filtering agents for useful, national security or criminal 
related information. In the Ackerman case, a private sector organization (AOL) found 
incriminating evidence on their email servers belonging to an individual. They gave that 
evidence to a non-profit intermediary crime reporting agency, which in turn provided the 
evidence to law enforcement. This model is one that can be replicated and encouraged on a large 
scale across the private sector, allowing government resources to focus on other areas of national 
security concern. As publicly available and open-source literature is sparse in this area, the 
coming decades will be critical for developing the empowerment of the private sector to be more 
self-sufficient regarding cybersecurity. Theoretically, while government operations in U.S. IP 
space will always be restricted, the private sector is not subject to these restrictions. This means 
that private sector organizations can collect, analyze, and report actionable intelligence to law 
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enforcement that law enforcement may never have found on their own due to restrictions faced 
by the government when collecting intelligence. 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Despite its relatively new presence in the overall scope of warfare, security, and national defense 
efforts, cyberspace has already become incredibly complex and elaborate. As often occurs with 
new issues, the current framework of laws and policies governing cyberspace, particularly U.S. 
IP space, has been constructed on an “as needed” basis. This means that technology develops 
rapidly and new threats emerge that target a very specific sector of society, to which the U.S. 
responds with the creation of new procedures and policies that protect that specific sector or 
defend against that particular threat. Though this can be an effective method of response, this 
method ultimately results in a patchwork of sector-specific laws, resulting in “overlapping and 
contradictory protections,”55 rather than comprehensive framework for both the Federal 
Government and the private sector. Despite this patchwork framework, DoD does not appear to 
be over-restricted in their ability to conduct national defense operations within cyberspace or 
U.S. IP space. 
Keeping this in mind, the following recommendation can be implemented in an effort to further 
improve the current cybersecurity framework without significantly changing operational abilities 
of DoD within cyberspace. This recommendation was evaluated as a potential policy proposal 
under the following questions: 1) The constitutionality of the policy; 2) The potential 
improvement to DoD operations; and 3) The most effective use of resources, i.e. allowing the 
private sector to handle certain aspects of cybersecurity if doing so can be done effectively and 
safely while allowing for scarce federal resources to be allocated to matters of national 
significance. 
1) Comprehensive policy changes that clarify the extent to which the private sector 
can defend themselves against hacking, through the use of active cyber defense 
measures. As defined under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, unauthorized 
access of a computer is an illegal act. On a practical level, this means that if a 
private company is hacked, they are not currently allowed to hack-back against 
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the intruder, even though such a tactic would help establish attribution and 
develop actionable evidence that can be provided to law enforcement. Since many 
law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to conduct such digital 
forensics,47 allowing private sector organizations to utilize hacking-back has the 
potential to greatly reduce the prevalence of cyber incidents. It should be noted 
that there is potential for negative, unintended consequences from such a measure. 
This was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, and it is a concern worth noting in this 
conversation. That being said, this paper argues that such consequences would be 
outweighed by the benefits, and thus the measures would be worth implementing. 
Such measures have been recently proposed, like those contained within the 
“Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act”61 authored by Congressman Tom Graves 
of Georgia. In Congressman Graves’ bill, private sector organizations would be 
able to hack back for the purposes of establishing the identity of the hacker, 
disrupting the incident, or monitoring the responsible party. Further, the 
provisions of the bill would implement specific procedures in reporting any hack 
back and the corresponding active defensive measures to law enforcement. This 
type of legislation, if implemented, has the potential to greatly improve the 
current cyber paradigm by creating a right to “self-defense” of digital property. 
Ultimately, if such a proposal were to be implemented, and as the private sector 
becomes more self-sufficient regarding cybersecurity, Federal resources could be 
saved purely for matters of national security. This would benefit both the private 
sector, which would gain increased response time to threats, and the Federal 
Government through the saving of funds. 
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The inherent dangers of cyberspace, to private individuals as well as institutions, systems, and 
networks owned by both government and private sector entities requires ample and coordinated 
protection. However, the research presented in this report shows that the current state of 
cybersecurity in the U.S. is far from coordinated. We have therefore developed the following 
recommendations for improving cybersecurity processes and systems and developing a 
comprehensive U.S. cyber framework. 
 Chapter recommendations
o Coordinated Federal cyber framework
o Small business reinforcement
o Public-private partnership for cybersecurity and cyberattack response
o Private sector self-defense
 Additional recommendations
o Reserve Cyber Guard
o Coordinated terminology
o Recommendation for further study
Chapter Recommendations 
The following are the recommendations that were provided in the previous chapters of this 
report. 
Coordinated Federal Framework (Chapter 1) 
The lack of consistency between the various documents that regulate and guide U.S. 
cybersecurity efforts, particularly at the Federal level, can be addressed through the development 
and implementation of a single, comprehensive cybersecurity and cyber incident response 
strategy. The establishment of the new Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Security Agency (CISA) 
within DHS as the new, central authority for cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection 
in 2018 affords the opportunity to place this development under the purview of one agency. The 
new cyber response document should include an incident handbook that aligns with the 2018 
National Cyber Strategy and the 2017 National Security Strategy and should be continuously 
updated to include the most accurate data and information for effective cyberattack response. 
132 
CISA would coordinate with the individual sector-specific agencies to update and align their 
individual cyber incident response plans to reflect and expand upon what is included in the new 
Federal guidance document, putting each individual sector of critical infrastructure in 
concurrence with the direction of the central authority and streamlines the individual response 
mechanisms for each sector. Lastly, through incorporating the updates and changes issued by 
CISA, the cyber infrastructure sections in each of the existing guidance documents should be 
completely removed or updated to reflect what is included in the new document.  
Small Business Reinforcement (Chapter 2) 
The inseparable relationship between government and the private sector requires cooperation 
with and the inclusion of private entities when developing a comprehensive cyber incident 
response framework. Extending government considerations for cybersecurity to the private 
sector is important as the private sector is the major vehicle for U.S. economic strength, and 
because the majority of critical infrastructure is owned and/or operated by private sector entities. 
Though there are potential concerns of government overreach and intrusion into private sector 
operations, there are ways to alleviate these concerns. 
Apart from the Federal Government regulating the cybersecurity systems of the private sector, 
there is a potential to establish cooperative support through cyber insurance. Cyber insurance 
provides compensation for damages and losses incurred as a result of a cyber incident. This type 
of policy could help save small businesses from closing as a result of a cyber incident. Because 
of the potential moral hazard that large companies will purchase such insurance as a replacement 
for increased investment into cybersecurity, and because the costs of such insurance are 
increasing due to the nature and proliferation of malicious cyber activity, intervention by the 
Federal Government may be required in order to encourage small businesses to purchase such 
insurance and to discourage large businesses from taking advantage of such a policy. 
Public-Private Partnership for Cybersecurity and Cyberattack Response (Chapter 2) 
Comprehensive and cooperative cyber incident response for both the government and the private 
sector can best be achieved through the implementation of a cybersecurity-specific public-private 
partnership. This type of partnership can benefit the government through a program in which the 
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government works with the private sector to provide training and establish direct hiring paths to 
transition professionals from the private sector into government cybersecurity positions. 
Bringing cybersecurity professionals from the private sector into the government not only will 
ensure that the best minds are working together toward a national cybersecurity framework, but 
it also provides transference of knowledge gained from private sector cyber concerns and 
solutions to the government. Additionally, this partnership can only be achieved successfully if 
the government provides more information regarding cyber threats with the private sector. The 
foundation for an effective public-private partnership is contingent on the information flow from 
one sector the other, and while the private sector may be more equipped at handling 
cybersecurity, an information-sharing mechanism should be utilized to share best practices 
between the sectors.  
Private Sector Self-Defense (Chapter 2) 
The Federal Government can also support the ability of the private sector to protect itself against 
malicious cyber activity. Legislation that has been proposed in Congress would allow private 
sector entities to utilize the hacking back method to disrupt the cyberattack and identify the 
responsible party. Placing more responsibility and capability for cyber response in the hands of 
the private sector would allow the government to focus its resources on matters of national 
security. This would also further strengthen the public-private partnership, as the government 
could leverage the strength of the private sector to accomplish the initial incident identification 
tasks, after which the government could investigate the necessary response mechanism. 
Additional Recommendations 
The following recommendations were developed in addition to those that described above, and 
are meant to be comprehensive of all findings, conclusions, and recommendations from our 
analyses. 
NCCIC Cyber Guard 
The NCCIC currently serves as the national hub for cyber and communications information, 
technical expertise, and operational integration.1 The NCCIC is contained within CISA and
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includes a variety of legacy programs. These programs include the National Communications 
System (NCS), National Coordinating Center (NCC), United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT), and Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response 
Team (ICS-CERT). Each of these functions support the following overall guiding principles of 
the NCCIC:1  
● Put Customers First;
● Lead the Global Mission;
● Be an Active Force for Good;
● Drive Innovation;
● Be Right, Be Fast;
● Earn Trust.
These principles are specifically intended to guide the critical mission activities. These mission 
activities include:1 
● Information Exchange;
● Training and exercises;
● Risk and vulnerability assessments;
● Data synthesis and analysis;
● Operation planning and coordination;
● Watch operations;
● Incident response and recovery.
In 2017, the NCCIC began to merge incident response and operational programs specifically 
under US-CERT and ICS-CERT. Bringing these two entities together under the NCCIC 
broadens the capabilities and mission of the NCCIC and increases the effectiveness of the overall 
mission to defend the nation’s critical infrastructure.1 NCCIC also works with the private sector 
to report cyber incidents and facilitate information sharing between the sectors. However, there 
is still the potential to improve the NCCIC operations and equip it with the capabilities to best 
fulfill its mission. Our recommendation for this improvement is to give select groups within the 
NCCIC, specifically those that function to support readiness and preparation, the same title 
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authorities as that of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and organize them in a single 
entity. This entity would be called NCCIC Cyber Guard.  
Currently, the USCG operates as an entity with DHS, not DoD.2 Although it is not housed under 
DoD, it is still considered a military service at all times under Title 14 of the U.S. Code.3,4 In 
times of war or when otherwise called on by the President, the USCG can be transferred to the 
Navy and used as a DoD entity through this Title. However, the USCG also operates 
domestically as it has authorities that DoD-only entities do not have, such as pollution response 
(Title 14), customs and border enforcement (Title 19), and vessel boarding within U.S. 
jurisdiction or beyond (Title 14). Though it has these domestic authorities, it also shares 
authorities with the DoD as it is part of the IC through Title 50.3 The importance and value of the 
USCG having multiple authorities allows them to operate in multiple arenas.   
Positive perception is vital for public support of a government agency or entity. Though the 
USCG is given Title 50 authorizations, it is not necessarily subject to the same public scrutiny as 
other IC agencies.5 Creating a non-DoD and autonomous cyber entity that is given multiple 
authorizations similar to that of the Coast Guard, rather than operating strictly as an intelligence 
agency, could instill public confidence and trust in the government’s ability to provide 
cybersecurity and incident response. 
The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS OIA) currently represents DHS interests 
within the IC.6 Operating with DHS OIA with Title 50 authorization would legally allow NCCIC 
to participate in activities within the IC during high risk situations. This could potentially 
improve the efficiency of information sharing between DHS and the IC in the event of or in 
preparation for a cyber incident. Additionally, authorizing the NCCIC with Title 32 operational 
powers could allow them to work in direct coordination with state National Guard units to again, 
streamline and improve efficiency for information sharing as well as incident response and 
mitigation.  
It is important to stress that the recommendation is not that the NCCIC is allowed to exercise all 
these authorities at any time; instead, they would be allowed to exercise the capabilities under 
each separate Title only when directed by the President in instances of high stress or 
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vulnerability. An example of this is during times of election. Allowing the NCCIC to have these 
authorities would enable it to better help prepare state and local governments through the 
National Guard (and Title 32) in the event of an election hack or breach. While National Guard 
units are beginning to build cyber capabilities, the resources and technically capabilities 
currently available within the NCCIC could be vital to creating a proactive posture in assisting 
the National Guard with SLTT response to a potential direct threat during the election.  
Additionally, this recommendation is likely to be received well by the American public. In the 
wake of the Edward Snowden leaks, public perception of the NSA greatly decreased and the 
public remains wary of U.S. intelligence operations.7 By allowing the NCCIC to assist in 
protecting American interests and infrastructure in this way, through having certain operational 
authorities at very explicit times, a viable option has been created for both functionality and 
public perception.  
Coordinated Terminology 
Another potential area in which the U.S. could improve regarding cybersecurity is adopting 
consistent terminology. In light of the potential risk that some cyber threats pose, especially 
when wielded by one government against another, the terms “cyberattack” and “cyberwar” have 
entered the lexicon. To regard a cyberattack as a potential act of war can be a reasonable 
assumption if the conventional (but not legal) definitions of these terms are applied. The Miriam-
Webster Dictionary, which for the purposes of this paper provides conventional definitions, 
defines war as “a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism.”8 An act of war could then be 
assumed to mean an action that instigates a state of antagonism. Cyberattack is likewise defined 
as “an attempt to gain illegal access to a computer or computer system for the purpose of causing 
damage or harm.”9 It is not hard to suggest that a correlation exists between “causing damage or 
harm” with “antagonism,” and therefore a cyberattack against a computer or computer system 
that serves a strategic military, intelligence, or defense purpose could be presumed to initiate a 
state of conflict. Indeed, Russia utilized a cyber incursion prior to its invasion of Georgia in 
2008.10 
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The assumptions presented above become less straightforward when the legal definitions of the 
terms, as specified in the U.S. Code (U.S.C), are considered. A cyber threat is defined as “an 
action, not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, on or 
through an information system that may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the 
security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an information system or information that is 
stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system.”11 This definition is similar to the 
Miriam-Webster definition above. An act of war, however, is defined as “armed conflict, 
whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations.”12 This legal definition 
differs from the conventional definition by including the term “armed conflict.” To regard a 
cyberattack as an act of war would therefore first require considering a cyberattack as a form of 
armed conflict. This correlation has yet to be legally established under the U.S.C. As such, it is 
difficult to conclude that the U.S. Congress currently has the legal authority to declare a war that 
is conducted solely in cyberspace. 
The legal definition is further complicated in that cyberattacks cannot always be directly linked 
to deliberate actions undertaken on behalf of nation or state (i.e. the problem with cyber 
attribution). In the case of the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, the Russian government denied 
any involvement; any retaliatory hostile actions against Russia by the U.S. would therefore have 
been considered unprovoked and could have resulted in a far worse situation, potentially an 
actual armed conflict. The U.S. instead chose to respond with sanctions against Russia as a 
deterrence against future cyber activity.13 This has led to further strain in U.S.-Russian relations. 
Considering these complications, the U.S. could look to the Tallinn Manual as a potential basis 
for both policy and legal frameworks regarding cyberattacks as acts of war. The Tallinn Manual 
2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, as commissioned by the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, provides a “comprehensive analysis of how 
existing international law should apply in the cyber realm.”14 The “rules” included in the Tallinn 
Manual present “broad principles and specific norms that apply in cyberspace.”15 Each rule also 
includes commentary from the International Group of Experts, distinguished legal scholars and 
practitioners that developed the Tallinn Manual. These Experts were led by Dr. Michael Schmitt, 
an American global cyber security expert.16 This commentary “indicates the… legal basis, 
applicability in international and non-international armed conflicts, and normative content.”15 
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The Tallinn Manual itself does not establish any laws and does not have the force of law, and 
was developed to be policy- and politically-neutral.16 The U.S., though instrumental in the 
development of the Manual, has been reluctant to adopt it in practice, with specific reservations 
about how the Manual defines state sovereignty regarding cyberspace and cyber activities. The 
particular concern is at what level a cyberattack can “legally” elicit a response.17 However, 
implementing principles and rules similar to what is included in the Tallinn Manual into all 
future cybersecurity frameworks or legislation will provide the U.S. with a relatively established 
international definition and understanding of cyberattack and cyber war, as well as to allow 
coordination with the international community regarding cybersecurity. 
Consistent and coordinated terminology would also require addressing USPI throughout Federal 
documents. This could be accomplished through the creation of a SIGINT annex to be included 
at the end of EO 12333, DoDM 5240.01, or Intelligence Community Directive 102. This annex 
would rectify the lack of consistency between the current laws, manuals or directives that do not 
necessarily address USPI and cyberspace uniformly, or even at all when discussing USPI 
specifically. This annex would outline, in detail, the lawful procedures of SIGINT collection, 
dissemination, and retention of USPI and the procedures that all federal agencies must follow 
when operating in U.S. IP space. The annex would be developed by interagency groups of 
lawyers and operators within the IC, as well as members of other stakeholder groups. This would 
be of benefit to the affected Federal agencies because it would lessen the potential for confusion 
of the current restrictions in place which prescribe Federal agency operations regarding USPI. 
Recommendation for Further Study 
The analyses presented in this report have identified deficiencies, inefficiencies, and even 
confusion in the current bureaucratic structure of cybersecurity and cyberattack response in both 
the public and private sectors. Based on the findings of these analyses, and particularly 
considering the overwhelming ubiquitous nature of cyberspace, we have concluded that further 
study into the possibility of a new, cabinet-level secretary of cybersecurity should be conducted.  
This recommendation exceeds the scope of this report, however our findings clearly indicate that 




Cybersecurity will continue to be an important but contentious issue, especially given the need to 
balance security with the right to privacy and the restrictions on government defense operations 
within U.S. IP space. The current method by which cybersecurity frameworks and strategies 
have been developed ad hoc as mandated by Executive Order or in response to growing cyber 
concerns will not be sufficient in the future, particularly as the cyber capabilities of adversarial 
nations like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea become more sophisticated and prolific. The 
government cannot afford to wait until a “digital Pearl Harbor” has occurred to develop a 
comprehensive, national cyber framework. The recommendations presented above can serve as a 
basic foundation around which such a framework could be structured and fully developed. 
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Annexes 
Annex A: Hypothetical Cyberattack on Abilene, Texas (Taylor County) 
The purpose of the following section is to illustrate the coordination, response, and recovery efforts between 
government and the private sector, utilizing the current governance and guidance documents presented in this 
report to respond to a cyberattack. The following scenario is entirely hypothetical and was created by the 
authors of this report.  
Background 
“The City of Abilene, Texas, is located approximately 180 miles due west of the Dallas/Fort 
Worth Metroplex. We’re situated in west-central Texas near the geographic center of the state. 
Situated adjacent to Interstate 20, Abilene serves as the county seat for Taylor County, one of 
254 counties in Texas. Taylor County has a current population of about 136,000, of which 
120,373 live within the Abilene city limits. 
Abilene's civic progressiveness and its logistic function as a regional center for distribution, 
commerce, industry, transportation, and education provide an assortment of lodging, dining, 
cultural, and shopping opportunities typically found only in much larger cities.”1 
Additionally, Abilene and Taylor County are home to Dyess Air Force Base (DAFB). DAFB is 
located 7 miles southwest of Abilene, Texas and covers 6,409 acres. DAFB employs more than 
5,000 people and has an annual economic impact of around $310 million on the local 
community, making it the single largest employer for the area. The base contains nearly 200 
facilities and 988 units of family housing. In total there are around 13,000 military personnel and 
civilians located on the base.2 
DAFB is home to the 7th Bomb Wing and the 317 Airlift Wing of the United States (U.S.) Air 
Force. The 7th Bomb Wing consists of the largest B-1B operations group comprising 33 B-1B 
Lancers and 1,140 personnel assigned to three squadrons: The 9th and 28th Bomb Squadrons, 
and the 7th Operations Support Squadron. As of March 2019, DAFB is now home to the new B-
21 Raider bomber mission and training center.3  
Scenario 
At approximately 1600 hours on Saturday, August 3, 2019, the City of Abilene Courthouse 
experiences a power outage. City officials first recognize that the outage has occurred when the 
Dell PowerEdge Server4 goes offline, quickly followed by the rest of the electrical power. Due to 
this power outage, all lines of communication are down. City officials then contact the local and 
regional electric power companies for assistance.  
 At 1800 hours, the Taylor County Judge and Sheriff make contact with DAFB, which has not 
lost power due to the renewable energy system that provides electrical power for the base.5 
Taylor County requests assistance from DAFB to help store food, route emergency 
communication, and provide other resources as necessary. At the same time, the Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) reaches out to DHS, which connects them with the 
Department of Energy (DOE), the sector-specific agency (SSA) for power-related emergencies.6 
DOE then reports the problem to its internal Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and 
Emergency Response.7 
By 2100 hours, three-quarters of Taylor County residents, or nearly 100,000 people, have lost 
power. The three electric power companies that own and operate facilities within Taylor County 
meet regarding the outages of their own servers and to address the now county-wide situation. 
Additional entities that are highly impacted by the loss of electrical power include, but are not 
limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, childcare centers, grocery stores, water and wastewater 
management facilities, and gas companies. 
 At this point in time, Taylor County requests help from the Governor of Texas.8 Additional 
assistance is requested from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).9,10 
At 2200 hours, the National Security Agency (NSA)10 along with the FBI determine that the 
power outage is due a cyberattack on the Taylor County electric systems achieved through a 
phishing email. The phishing email released a worm into the Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems within the electrical generation plants. The worm was intended to 
monitor the machine-controlling software, specifically targeting the smart meter to allow for 
remote access to shut down the power grid. Once the worm identified gaps in the system, it 
inserted itself into the smart meter to take control of the functions and shut down the power grid.  
At 13 hours after the electrical power went out, 0500 on Day 2 of the power outage, state and 
local authorities have not determined attribution for the cyberattack. At this point, the Governor 
of Texas calls on the President to make an Emergency Declaration through the Stafford Act.11 
The President then directs DHS to act through various cyber coordination and response plans 
such as the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP)10 and the National Response 
Framework (NRF).12  
During this time, however, officials working the response discover that hackers of unknown 
identity and origin have been accessing the electric system for the past 6 to 8 months, remaining 
dormant but monitoring the systems during vulnerability testing until they could exploit a 
vulnerability that had not yet been patched by the electrical power companies. When this 
vulnerability was discovered, the hackers launched the attack on the city of Abilene using the 
phishing email. 
The Department of Defense (DoD), specifically U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), at this time are on standby for national response 
but are communicating and working with DAFB to ensure their safety and security against the 
attack. They are operating in support of DAFB, ready to support NSA activities if called upon.10  
At around mid-day on Day 2 of the power outage, the NSA and FBI make the assessment, with 
moderate confidence, that the phishing email initiated a distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attack to establish an advanced persistent threat (APT). At around mid-day on Day 3, the NSA 
and FBI attribute the attack to hacking groups located in Iran. This assessment is made based on 
intelligence reports that have recently discussed the growing capabilities of Iran to perform 
DDoS attacks on critical infrastructure, specifically electric grids. Additionally, this pattern 
resembles previous, similar Iranian DDoS attacks against the U.S. Financial Sector conducted 
between 2012 and 2013.13 
It is unknown at this time what the effects of this attack have had on the entirety of the ERCOT 
power grid in the state of Texas. 
Timeline Analysis 
In applying our research to this scenario, we observed that the majority of the agencies involved, 
as stipulated through the relevant guidance documents, each assert themselves as being the entity 
in charge. This observation was confirmed through speaking with DoD, FBI, and DHS officials 
who work in the cybersecurity realm, each of whom provided a different answer regarding which 
agency is “in charge” in the event of this attack.  
The following commentary outlines the events and effects of the attack, as well as the response 
and recovery operations. The commentary has been structured to match the timeline included at 
the end of this Annex, and they should be viewed together. The first (bottom) tier of the four-
tiered timeline documents the effects of the attack on and the response and recovery efforts of the 
government, private sector, and critical infrastructure stakeholders affected by the power outage. 
This tier corresponds with Table A-1 below. The second tier, in gray, presents the response 
actors that are working to mitigate the issues of the sector problems. The third and fourth tiers, in 
green and blue, respectively, present the guidance and governance documents that specify the 
authorities and details for response and recovery efforts.  
Sector Problems Timeline (Base Tier)  
Table A-1 presents the time and description of the effects of the attack, and the response and 
recovery efforts. Each color in the Timeline Key corresponds to a specific sector affected by the 
attack.   
Timeline Key:  
 
Power Company (Co.) - Magenta 
Fire and Police Responders - Red 
Food/Agriculture - Orange 
Water - Yellow 
Health - Green 
Fuel - Blue 
Dyess Air Force Base (DAFB) - Purple 
TC - Taylor County- Grey 






Table A-1a Sector Problems Timeline – Day 1 
Event Time Sector Description  
START 1600 TC SCADA Systems are Compromised - Power Goes Out. 
1 Power Co. Power companies try to restore power. 
2 Fire/Police Fire and Police are notified of the blackout.  
3 Food/Ag 
Ovens, fryers, fridges, lights begin to turn off in restaurants 
throughout Abilene.   
4 1700 Fuel 
Gas stations begin to cease pumping gas from the electric grid, those 
with generators continue pumping. 
5 Power Co. 
Power companies follow standard protocol and notify ERCOT of the 
outage. 
6 1800 Fire/Police 
Police Units are dispatched to control traffic due to street lights not 
being operational. 
7 DAFB TC calls DAFB about the outage - power assistance request.  
8 Power Co. Power companies determine it was a forced outage, not natural.  
9 2000 Health Hospitals cancel all nonessential appointments and elective surgeries. 
10 Food/Ag 
Refrigerated Food goes bad- FDA recommends that households, 
grocery stores, and restaurants throw refrigerated food out after 4 
hours. 
11 Fire/Police 
Fire and EMS respond to multiple vehicular accidents, fires, and 
medical emergencies. 
12 DAFB 
TC requests DAFB to store food/essential resources under their 
energy source.  
13 2100 TC TC all residents have lost power. 
14 Food/Ag 
No safe refrigerated food is available in the town of Abilene, 
restaurants shut down. 
 2200 TC Phishing email discovered at the power generation plants.  
15 Power Co. Power companies request FBI assistance for digital forensics. 
16 Health 
Increased numbers of people heading to hospital/ other health 
providers due to accidents (“ambulance diversion”-- sending people 
to other places). 
17 2300 Fire/Police 
Police Units patrol the streets in order to minimize crime and assure 
citizens that order is being maintained.  
18 DAFB 
Police begin routing calls through DAFB - keep up information 
sharing for response overnight. 
Table A-1b Sector Problems Timeline – Day 2 
Event Time Sector Description 
19 0500 TC Governor calls President for Emergency Declaration  
20 Power Co. Power companies continue to use backup generators to operate.  
21 DAFB 
DAFB begins working with local responders once resources are 
exhausted on response - Fire/Police, support role only. DAFB/DoD 
can begin mobilizing for emergency response independently of 
support function. 
22 Fuel 
Gas stations cease pumping via generators, using all of their on-hand 
supply of fuel. 
23 Food/Ag Other counties bring food through food trucks.  
24 Fire/Police 
Police are placed at gas stations who continue to pump gas in order to 
control fueling.  
25 Mid-Day Federal 
USCYBERCOM and USNORTHCOM on standby for national 
response. 
26 Health Generators at the hospitals run out of initial rounds of power. 
27 Food/Ag 
Chain grocery stores get back up food from the chain store and chain 
restaurants but still cannot produce their own. 
28 Federal 
NSA and FBI have determined that there has been a DDoS and APT 
attack. 
29 Power Co. 
Power companies work with surrounding counties for power 
sourcing.  
30 PM Fire/Police 
DAFB/TXNG provides units to assist in the security of Abilene due 
to an increase in looting and crime.   
Table A-1c Sector Problems Timeline – Day 3 
Event Time Sector Description 
31 Health 
Vaccines at the hospital spoil (3 hours after refrigerators go down) 
and loss of access to medication, vaccines, water pressure, etc. 
32 AM Power Co. 
Power company IT teams work with federal entities to help mitigate 
the potential attribution of Iran and protecting their systems 
henceforth. 
33 Health Start evacuating critical patients (start “triaging”). 
34 Food/Ag 
Guards stationed outside of grocery stores protecting food and 
supplies.  
35 Fuel 
Roads begin to clog as vehicles run out of gas and are abandoned or 
pushed to the side. 
36 Mid-Day Health 
Elderly/chronically ill, critical patients, begin to pass due to 
prolonged exposure to the heat, lack of machines and access to 
medicine. 
37 Federal 
 NSA and FBI make the assessment that this attack is linked to 
hacking groups located in Iran. 
38 Fire/Police 
Family resource centers are established to assist families of first 
responders.  
39 Fuel Fuel for cooking, such as propane, begins running out. 
40 Water 
Small wastewater plants begin to back up and generators have to be 
turned off. Water plant accidents occur as automatic controls allow 
for chemical leaks, or water is shut down completely. 
41 PM Fire/Police 
Fire and Police “leave their post” and return to their families after 
three days of constant operations.  
Response Actors (Second Tier) 
When the Abilene City County courthouse experiences the power outage, they communicate 
with the local power companies to determine when power will be restored. The power companies 
are working through their operation plans to try to restore power. At this time, the power 
companies are working with ERCOT14 which uses the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) framework to identify and mitigate threats.15 The power companies and 
ERCOT determine that it was a forced outage, and not due to natural events. Shortly afterwards, 
county officials call the Governor for aid, and the Texas National Guard is deployed to 
investigate the incident.12 At 2200 hours, the FBI discovers the phishing email and works with 
the power companies to respond.9 During this time, first responders begin deploying in the 
county in response to the needs of the citizens. 
The next morning, the National Guard, operating under the authority of state officials, 
determines that response and recovery efforts exceed the capabilities and resources of the state 
and advise the Governor’s office to call request assistance from the Federal Government. With 
this information, the Governor of Texas asks the President to make an Emergency Declaration 
through the Stafford Act.16 Because the emergency directly affects the security of the electrical 
grid, the Secretary of Energy is authorized under Energy Department Rule 83 FR 1174 to order 
emergency measures to protect and restore the affected sections of the grid.17 The NSA is 
brought in to help the FBI at this same time.10 Shortly after the emergency declaration, the NSA 
and FBI determine that there has been a DDoS and APT attack on the Taylor County electric 
systems. With moderate confidence, the NSA and FBI eventually attribute the attack to hacking 
groups located in Iran. They advise the President of the new information. Throughout the day, 
the power companies are operating on backup generators to continue their work.  
At the local level, the Taylor County Judge and Sheriff contact DAFB to request assistance to 
store food, help route emergency communication, and provide other resources as necessary. At 
the Federal level, DoD, specifically USNORTHCOM and USCYBERCOM, have been on stand-
by for national response but are communicating and working with DAFB to ensure their safety 
and security against the attack.10 They are operating in support of DAFB and in support of NSA 
if called upon. Finally, private parties have begun entering Taylor County, bringing supplies for 
those in need. This includes power companies from outside the area, who are providing 
additional power support.  
Guidance Documents (Third Tier) 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is the primary guideline to ensuring risk 
management for the nation’s critical infrastructure.6 Specifically regarding cyber, the NIPP 
works directly with the five mission areas of the NRF: prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery.12 Taylor County should be implementing NIPP and the NRF throughout 
the year so that in the event of an incident like this cyberattack, they already have the appropriate 
measures in place to respond to the cascading effects of the loss of power, similar to the response 
mechanisms of a natural disaster. 
NIST, part of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), has set standards for cybersecurity 
protection for critical infrastructure.15 These standards are a voluntary framework for private 
sector entities to implement as protective measures against cyberattacks. It is recommended that 
Taylor County abide by these standards year-round. 
The NCIRP outlines three major response mechanisms that can be applied to this scenario and 
that are officially implemented after the emergency declaration for Federal response has been 
issued by the President. The first mechanism defines DHS authority for asset response.10 
Although DHS authority technically begins almost immediately through the DOE as the SSA6, 
they are officially assigned, through NCIRP, with asset response at this time.10 The second 
mechanism defines the responsibility of DOJ for threat response.10 Similar to DHS, DOJ is 
involved, albeit remotely, through the initial assistance of the FBI. The more direct 
responsibilities of the DOJ are initiated through the authorization of NCIRP. The third 
mechanism identifies the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as the lead 
coordinator of intelligence support.10 This creates an issue regarding authority for intelligence 
gather, specifically whether the FBI is the lead authority, or if ODNI is the lead authority, and 
coordinates with the FBI and NSA. Threat response and intelligence gathering go hand-in-hand, 
but until it is deemed an international threat, ODNI does not have quite the capabilities of the 
FBI with respect to domestic intelligence. Additionally, through the affected entity response, the 
specific SSA, in this case DOE, will step in to coordinate information sharing and response. 
Federal response will be limited, however, in the event that an attack effects privately-owned 
critical infrastructure such as ERCOT. This is somewhat contradictory to the Federal response 
authorized in the above mechanisms.10 
Governance Documents (Top Tier) 
In the event of a cyberattack, the state of Texas implements the Texas Cybersecurity Strategic 
Plan (TCSSP), which outlines five goals that must be met in order to ensure security against 
cyberattacks.17 These goals include cohesion between state and Federal agencies, proactive 
defenses, a well-trained workforce, improved response times, and outreach programs. The 
TCSSP provides both the government and the private sector a guideline for cyber situations as 
well as a plan to improve future response. Although this plan is currently officially in place, it 
provides little guidance on what to do in the event of an attack outside of utilizing information 
sharing methods.  
The Texas Department of Information Resources (TDIR) has a response handbook that provides 
state and private entities with a specific approach to an emergency situation, including cyber 
incidents.18 However, this handbook primarily covers only what to do in the event of a data 
breach.  Despite this, the handbook can still be considered a good preliminary resource for state-
level attack response. This handbook outlines contact the State Chief Information Security 
Officer and the State Cybersecurity Coordinator.19 
When the Governor of Texas informs the President that the resources of Taylor County and 
Texas have been insufficient to address the attack and restore power, the Governor requests that 
the President declares the attack an emergency in order to mobilize Federal resources. After 
reviewing situational reports from the Governor, DOE and FBI, the President agrees and issues 
the emergency declaration. Federal resources are mobilized in accordance with the Stafford Act. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security is directed to assume coordination of the Federal response. 
In accordance with PPD-41, the SSAs for the affected sectors of critical infrastructure, through 
NCIRP, are instructed to become directly involved in the response and recovery efforts.20 The 
agencies to be involved in the efforts are:6 DHS for the Commercial Facilities, Communications, 
Dams, Emergency Services, Government Facilities (jointly with the General Services 
Administration), Information Technology, and Transportation Systems (jointly with the 
Department of Transportation) sectors; DoD for the Defense Industrial Base sector (specifically 
for DAFB); DOE for the Energy Sector; the Department of the Treasury for the Financial 
Services sector; the Department of Health and Human Services for the Healthcare and Public 
Health sector; the Department of Agriculture for the Food and Agriculture sector (jointly with 
the Department of Health and Human Services); and the Environmental Protection Agency for 
the Water and Wastewater Systems sector. In total, eight Federal departments and agencies are 
dispatched to assist in response and recovery efforts covering thirteen sectors of critical 
infrastructure. 
Additionally, under PPD-21 and PEO 13800, DOJ and FBI are specifically instructed to begin 
investigating the attack to determine appropriate attribution.21,22  
Applied Recommendation 
The Rapid Attack Detection, Isolation and Characterization Systems (RADICS) program, 
sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), is a program that tests 
the security of power grids within the Energy Sector. It enables a black-start recovery of power 
grids and provides educational and training opportunities for cybersecurity personnel, engineers, 
and other stakeholders within the Energy Sector. RADICS has partnered with DOE to conduct 
three different exercises.23 It should be noted that this program expires in 2020.24 
Jack Voltaic 2.0, a cyberattack exercise project sponsored by the Army Cyber Institute (ACI) and 
conducted in cooperation with the city of Houston, DHS and a variety private, state, and Federal 
entities, is an example of a simulation or exercise that can be used to demonstrate cyberattack 
response capabilities and authorities for critical infrastructure. This exercise, conducted in 
Houston in 2018, showed that state and local governments are not properly equipped to handle a 
large-scale cyberattack that affects multiple sectors of critical infrastructure.25 
Based on the results and analyses presented in this study, and considering the results obtained 
from the RADICS program and the Jack Voltaic exercise, it is our recommendation that both of 
these programs continue beyond 2020. Additionally, it is recommended that RADICS and Jack 
Voltaic should be conducted in coordination with each other. The exercises conducted under 
these programs should be expanded to include all 16 sectors of critical infrastructure and should 
be administered by CISA through the National Risk Management Center (NRMC). CISA should 
work with a variety of critical infrastructure stakeholders, including those in the private sector, to 
build upon the relationships that RADICS and Jack Voltaic have established. The benefit of 
continuing these programs and exercises is that they can help further prepare local, state, and 
Federal authorities and private sector entities in cyber response management and coordination, 
and help to identify. Using CISA to conduct these exercises allows for the combination of 
resources that were used in both Jack Voltaic and RADICS.  
The results of our audit on the coordination of cyberattack response, through research in open-
source literature, found that depending on the entity or agency in question, the approach to 
response and identification/delegation of the lead authority for cyberattack response differs, and 
can often be contradictory. Using simulations or exercises like RADICS and Jack Voltaic to 
further engage the response authorities will provide clarity for directing and conducting a 
response to a cyberattack against critical infrastructure, which can improve the safety and 
security of our nation.  
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Annex B: List of Referenced Governance Documents 
Intro 
● The Stafford Act – authorizes the President to issue two types of declarations that could 
potentially provide federal assistance to states and localities in response to a major 
disaster or terrorist attack: a “major disaster declaration” or an “emergency declaration”. 
This act provides a framework for disaster response and recovery.
Chapter 1 
● National Infrastructure Protection Plan – the core document used for critical
infrastructure preparedness and protections to ensure secure and resilient critical
infrastructure. The plan does this through establishing a framework in which the private
and public sector come together to share information, communicate, and prepare for
attacks.
● Presidential Policy Directive 21 – states the Federal Government has a responsibility to
strengthen the security and resilience of its own critical infrastructure against both
physical and cyber threats. This directive established sixteen critical infrastructure
sectors. The sixteen sectors are responsible for the financial, industrial, security, public
health, communication, technological, and other critical infrastructure functions of our
nation.
● Executive Order 13010 – established the President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection.
● Executive Order 13636 – directs the Executive Branch to develop a technology-neutral
voluntary cybersecurity framework;  promote and incentivize the adoption of
cybersecurity practices; increase the volume, timeliness and quality of cyber threat
information sharing; incorporate strong privacy and civil liberties protections into every
initiative to secure our critical infrastructure; and explore the use of existing regulation to
promote cyber security.
● National Cyber Incident Response Plan – articulates the “roles and responsibilities,
capabilities, and coordinating structures” for response and recovery from cyber incidents
affecting critical infrastructure.
● Presidential Executive Order (PEO) on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal
Networks and Critical Infrastructure – implements “The Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” produced by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). The PEO modernizes the cyber defense plans applied in PPD-21.
● National Response Framework – describes the roles, responsibilities, and structures for 
response “of a threat or hazard, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an 
incident”  
 
● Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity – consists of standards, 
guidelines, and best practices to manage cybersecurity-related risk. The Framework's 
prioritized, flexible, and cost-effective approach helps to promote the protection and 
resilience of critical infrastructure and other sectors important to the economy and 
national security.  
 
● CISA Act – amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to re-designate the Department 
of Homeland Security's (DHS's) National Protection and Programs Directorate as the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. It transfers resources and 
responsibilities of the directorate to the agency.  
 
● Presidential Policy Directive 41 – created principles that guide the Federal Government’s 
response to any cyber incident, whether involving government or private sector entities. 
 
● Department of Defense Cyber Strategy – represents the Department’s vision for 
addressing cyber threats and implementing the priorities of the National Security Strategy 





● Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 – prohibits “unfair and deceptive 
acts and practices in or affecting commerce.”  
 
● HHS Breach Notification Rule, 2013 – requires “HIPAA covered entities and their 
business associates to provide notification following a breach of unsecured, protected 
health information.” 
 
● Financial Modernization Act of 1999 or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 1999 – 
requires financial institutions to disclose how they protect and share their customers’ 
personal data. 
 
● Posse Comitatus Act – prevents the use of military involvement in law enforcement, 
except in very explicit circumstances where the military can assist civilian law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
● Texas - Business & Commerce Code § 521.052 – requires business and nonprofit sports 
associations that collect personal data to provide “reasonable procedures” to protect data.  
 
● California - Civil Code § 1798.91.04 – requires manufacturers of connected devices to 
equip devices with reasonable security features to protect data they may collect, contain, 
or transmit from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. 
 
● Colorado - H.B. 18-1128 – requires that entities that collect data develop written policies 
for the disposal of personal information when it is no longer needed.  
 
● General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – passed into law in 2016 and made 
enforceable in 2018, GDPR is one of the toughest data protection laws in place. It gives 
the individual rights to their data that is held by companies, by implementing high 




● The Patriot Act Section 215 – allowed the NSA to acquire “any tangible thing” from third 
parties (such as telephone companies) if it could persuade the FISA Court that the item 
was “relevant” to a foreign intelligence investigation. 
 
● EO 12333 – established broad new surveillance authorities for the intelligence 
community, outside the scope of public law. 
 
●  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702 – removed the requirement that the 
government obtain a warrant from the FISA Court when seeking to wiretap 
communications between a foreign target and an American from inside the US. 
 
● US Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy – “This strategy provides 
the Department with a framework to execute our cybersecurity responsibilities during the 
next five years to keep pace with the evolving cyber risk landscape by reducing 
vulnerabilities and building resilience; countering malicious actors in cyberspace; 
responding to incidents; and making the cyber ecosystem more secure and resilient.” 
 
● Intelligence Community Directive 102 – created to improve the capability of IC elements 
to collect, retain, and disseminate information, in order to protect the US from terrorism 
and other threats to national security, while ensuring the IC activities are carried out in a 
manner that protects the legal rights, civil liberties, and privacy interests of US persons.  
 
● Title 10 – outlines the role of armed forces in the United States Code. Federal authority 
over Service members falls under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. These laws apply to active 
duty, Reservists, and Guard members who are ordered to federal-level active duty for 
federal-level missions. Funding comes from the federal government and the President of 
the United States has authority over these Service members. Title 10 also provides the 
basis for the roles, missions and organization of each of the branches of armed services as 
well as the United States Department of Defense. 
 
● Title 50 – governs how the US declares and conducts its wars, and how it ensures 
national security 
 
● Uniform Digital Assets Law – under this law, digital assets encompass all “electronic 
record in which an individual has a right or interest” 
 
● Fourth Amendment – “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
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This Annex presents another version of the Guidance Document Analysis Scorecard included in Chapter 1. However, this version is separated by 
document only, with each of the agencies that have major duties identified in the columns underneath. The overlap is shown by the color coordination 
of each of the agencies and entities involved.  
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